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TOWARD A PERIPHERAL VIEW 
OF MANUFACTURING NETWORKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I was a peripheral visionary. I could see the future, but only way off to the side. 
(Steven Wright) 
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FOREWORD 
This doctoral thesis unfolds into a collection of three distinct articles that share an 
interest in supply firms, or “peripheral firms”. The three studies offer a novel theoretical 
perspective that I call the peripheral view of manufacturing networks.  Building on the 
relational view literature (Dyer and Singh, 1998), this new perspective identifies the 
supplier-based theoretical standpoint to analyze and explain the antecedents of 
relational rents in manufacturing networks. My interest in suppliers has three roots. 
Firstly, as an Italian scholar, I have grown up surrounded by interesting examples of 
firms that compete in manufacturing networks or industrial districts as suppliers of other 
firms. For decades, these Italian firms have managed to be competitive in international 
markets despite their small size, undercapitalization, and lacking internationalization. I 
have always wondered how these firms could sustain their competitiveness, as many of 
their characteristics appeared counterproductive to success in large markets. However, 
international strategic management literature has only partially provided analysis on 
suppliers’ competitive advantage and my wonderment as to their competitiveness has 
remained. With this study, I propose a touchstone for a deeper understanding and future 
research on exactly this kind of peripheral, but highly competitive firm. Secondly, the 
group of scholars who has decisively shaped my academic training developed relevant 
advances about theory concerning firm relations (Lipparini and Sobrero, 1994; 
Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999), firms networks (Cattani, Ferriani, Negro and Perretti, 
2008; Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999a, 1999b; Lorenzoni, 1990), and core-periphery 
approaches (Cattani and Ferriani, 2008). In building on their contributions, I offer an 
incremental theoretical advancement concerning firm relations, observing dyads as unit 
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of analysis. Finally, the recent international financial crisis has dramatically influenced 
the competitiveness of peripheral firms, sometimes leading suppliers to failure. The 
international crisis has led me to question the validity of established supply firms’ 
business models, which scholars have so far considered successful. Theory states that in 
order to brave competence-destroying exogenous changes, firms must redefine their 
core capabilities and recombine internal resources (Zander and Kogut, 1995). 
Accordingly, I believe that research should play a primary role in providing orientation 
for managers’ decision-making in rough times. Therefore, I propose a framework that 
not only contributes to theory, but also delivers useful tips and instruments to 
practitioners who are leveraging competitive strategy to sustain their firm’s survival. 
The manuscript develops as follows.  
The first article, the namesake of the dissertation, is a theoretical contribution that 
explains the foundations of the “peripheral view of manufacturing networks”. In 
technology-based industries, alliances between assemblers/buyers, or core/focal firms, 
and suppliers, or peripheral firms, are common practice to foster innovation as well as 
relational rents. Assemblers mostly drive innovation in the early phases of an industry 
life cycle, but as products become more complex, the locus of innovation shifts to 
suppliers. Despite the increasing relevance of peripheral firms, strategic management 
literature principally focuses on focal firms. I affirm that it is misleading to 
underestimate the role of strategic suppliers in innovation development. This is why 
studies on the “peripheral view of the network” might foster a deeper understanding of 
relational rents generation and innovation drivers in technology-based industries by 
leveraging analysis of strategic suppliers through a specific lens.  
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The second article “Framing The Strategic Peripheries: A Novel Typology of 
Suppliers” is an empirical study with the aim to offer an interpretation of peripheries’ 
characteristics and dynamics. Leveraging data collected in a longitudinal multiple-case 
study of eighteen firms in the Italian motorcycle part industry, I develop a four-type 
classification of suppliers based on two relation-based dimensions: asset specificity, 
which is a proxy for relational capabilities, and strategic focus, which is a proxy for 
operational ambidexterity. Four types of peripheries emerge: (1) Niche Suppliers (low 
asset specificity – narrow strategic focus); (2) Flexible Suppliers (low asset specificity – 
wide strategic focus); (3) Committed Suppliers (high asset specificity – narrow strategic 
focus); and (4) Multi-Purpose Suppliers (high asset specificity – wide strategic focus). 
Results suggest that different levels of relational capabilities correspond to diverse 
positioning in the industry, and therefore reveal different types of suppliers’ competitive 
strategy. I advance nine theoretical propositions that explain how the interplay between 
relational capabilities and operational flexibility affects peripheries’ competitive 
advantage.  
The third article, “What is Behind Absorptive Capacity? Dispelling the Opacity of 
R&D” presents an example of general theory development by using data from 
peripheral firms. This empirical paper contributes to the concept of absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Strategic management scholarship has identified research 
and development investments as the main proxy to observe absorptive capacity. 
However, literature shows that using exclusively R&D figures fails to unravel the 
dynamic set of processes and routines standing behind firms’ commitment toward 
knowledge absorption and exploitation. I unpack the concept of R&D and present a 
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four-type typology of R&D strategies based on knowledge scope and asset specificity. 
In a second step, I combine the four-type typology with prior scholarly contributions to 
advance an extension of the absorptive capacity model. Evidence displays significant 
intra-industry differences in R&D strategies, which affect the ways in which firms 
develop potential and realized absorptive capacity. My results disconfirm previous 
research, showing that regimes of appropriability affect not only the exploitation of 
knowledge for commercial outcomes, but also the decision-making process that firms 
face before engaging in R&D activities. 
The main thrust of my argument points to the impossibility of fully understanding 
how dyads and firm networks compete if we keep relying on unbalanced and biased 
studies that focus solely on the core firm in a partnership. In the following three articles, 
I demonstrate that, due to their particular nature, supply firms deserve specific 
theoretical analysis, which might paradoxically reveal that peripheries do not play a 
peripheral role, but instead are fundamental players in the competition between firm 
networks. 
 
 
Bologna, March 2011 
 
Paolo Aversa 
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TOWARD A PERIPHERAL VIEW 
OF MANUFACTURING NETWORKS 
 
ABSTRACT 
In technology-based industries, alliances between assemblers (core/focal firms) and 
suppliers (peripheral firms) are common practice to foster innovation and relational 
rents. Assemblers mostly drive innovation in the early phases of an industry life cycle, 
but as products become more complex, the locus of innovation shifts to suppliers. 
Despite the increasing relevance of peripheral firms, strategic management literature 
principally focuses on focal firms. This work affirms it is misleading to underestimate 
the role of strategic suppliers in innovation development. By analyzing strategic 
suppliers through a customized lens, research on the “peripheral view of manufacturing 
networks” might foster a deeper understanding of relational rents generation and 
innovation drivers in technology-based industries.  
 
 
Keyworks: peripheral view, suppliers, relational view, focal firms, networks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The strategic use of knowledge is one of the most discussed topics in management 
and organizational literature (Badaracco, 1991; Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996a, 1996b; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995, 2004; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Winter, 1987), especially when it is framed in 
a relational perspective (Gulati, 1998, 1999; Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer, 2000; Porter, 
Whittington and Powell, 2005). The relational view literature has attempted to 
understand the importance of alliances to develop knowledge and, therefore, create 
relational rents1. (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Dyer and Singh affirm that supernormal 
profits derive, among others, from “substantial knowledge exchange, including the 
exchange of knowledge that results in joint learning” (Dyer and Singh, 1998 : 882). 
Knowledge exchanges differ depending on the type of agents involved. Within 
manufacturing networks, scholars have identified two main roles: assembler/buyer and 
supplier. To some extent, almost every firm is engaged in assembly, purchase, and 
supply activities. According to relational view scholars, we define assemblers/buyers as 
those firms whose main activity is to design and develop finished products, which are 
often directly distributed to end-markets. We define suppliers as those organizations 
whose main activity is manufacturing components and parts, which are sold to other 
manufacturers. Therefore, suppliers mainly engage in business-to-business markets, 
while assemblers are traditionally oriented toward business-to-consumer markets. Due 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Although Dyer and Singh (1998) use the term “relational rents,” according to Peteraf it would 
be more correct to use the term “quasi-rents” due to the temporary nature of relational profits. In 
fact, Peteraf defines quasi-rent as "returns that exceed a factor's short run opportunity cost ... 
[and] are an excess over the returns to a factor in its next best use" (1994: 155).	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to their centrality and their importance within the supply network, scholars traditionally 
define assemblers as “core firms” or “focal firms” and suppliers as “peripheral firms” 
(Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gottfredson, Puryear and Phillips, 2005; Lerro and Schiuma, 
2005; Mintzberg, Pascale, Goold and Rumelt, 1996; Pascale, 1996; Takeishi, 2001). 
However, as products become more complex and competition fiercer, assemblers 
struggle to innovate and develop their products as a whole. To brave the increasing pace 
of competition, assemblers become knowledge integrators that combine modular 
innovations developed by peripheral firms as sub-components (Brusoni and Prencipe, 
2001; Brusoni et al., 2001). Their focus changes from manufacturing to design, 
assembly and suppliers coordination. As a result, scholars affirmed that in those cases 
the locus of innovation shifts from assemblers to suppliers (Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996). However, strategic management scholars have continued to focus their 
attention on core firms, instead dedicating some attention to the new innovation players. 
Analyzing innovation exclusively observing core firms’ activities would be consistent if 
theory demonstrated that the two types of organizations – assemblers and suppliers – 
are the same. But are they the same? Can we expect that the theories, methods, and 
implications scholarship has developed for assemblers, can be applied consistently to 
suppliers? To answer this question Table 3 compares the stereotypical differences of a 
core firm and peripheral firm.  
Even at first glance, suppliers look different from assemblers. Indeed, literature 
demonstrated that they have distinctive characteristics and engage in specific strategies 
(Kaufman, Wood and Theyel, 2000). Firstly, suppliers have a narrower domain and 
compete in niche markets more often than assemblers (Hambrick, MacMillan and Day, 
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1982). Niche markets are usually smaller than mass markets, and thus limits firms’ 
dimensional growth (Cooper, Willard and Woo, 1986). As a result, within the same 
industry suppliers are usually smaller than the assemblers they work for. In recent years, 
literature has clearly pointed out the specific characteristics of small firms (Acs and 
Audretsch, 1987; Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Covin and Slevin, 1989; MacMillan, 
Hambrick and Day, 1982). Accordingly to literature on small firms, being small implies 
less resources, narrower domains, and less vertical integration (Hambrick et al., 1982).  
 
TABLE 3 
Characteristics of  Stereotypical Focal Firms and Peripheral Firms 
 
 
However, Chen and Hambrick have demonstrated two important findings: (1) Small 
firms can be as effective as large ones and (2) Small firms require different competitive 
strategies to reach success (1995 : 454). Secondly, most suppliers do not have direct 
Characteristics Focal Firm Peripheral Firm
Synonyms Core firm
Assembler
Buyer
Supplier
Part/component manufacturer
Common Size Bigger than peripheral firms Smaller than focal firms
Network Centrality High Medium-Low
Production Final products Parts, components, services
Market Mass market Niche market
Innnovation process Knowledge intergrator Knowledge developer
Access to end market Common Uncommon
Access to focal firms Yes, for partnerships Yes, for commercial relation
Standard barganing power High Low
Organization Structured Unstructured
Reputation Well known Unknown
Reporting Structured, often mandatory Unstructured, often non-mandatory
Ownership Public Private
Family business Possible Common
Example Car manufacturer Brake manufacturer
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access to commercial distribution since their own value chain ends with sales to the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) customer. Instead, by integrating the suppliers’ 
work into the whole supply chain, assemblers mostly obtain stronger bargaining power, 
while suppliers suffer higher pressures from customers (Kang, Mahoney and Tan, 
2009). The clear distinction between suppliers and assemblers implies different 
problems and requires a tailored analytical lens. Yet, scholars within the relational view 
have mainly focused their attention on a “core perspective” by centering on assemblers’ 
relational strategies. Due to this lack of attention to suppliers’ activities, scholars have 
not fully understood the pivotal set of processes affecting innovation within supply 
firms. Furthermore, even the few authors specifically focusing on suppliers used a core-
firm standpoint, such as relying on assembler opinion to gather information about 
supplier roles and activities. For example, Sako (2004) describes the factors that affect 
the sustained development and replication of organizational capabilities at the supplier 
level from a core perspective. This method can potentially develop biased 
interpretations when data is not properly triangulated. 
After almost three decades of focusing on core firms, scholars should adopt a 
perspective tailored to suppliers’ characteristics as well in order to fully interpret the 
processes influencing innovation within technology-driven industries. Also, when 
possible, future studies should integrate both perspectives to get a complete view of the 
relational landscape. This paper promotes a novel perspective that we call the 
“peripheral view” of manufacturing networks, defined as the supplier-based theoretical 
standpoint that explains the antecedents of relational rents.  
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PAST RESEARCH ON RELATIONAL VIEW 
In 1998, Dyer and Singh published a theoretical work defining a body of recent 
literature that focused on understanding the effects of dyad/network routines and 
processes on firms’ relational rents and competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998 : 
661). The authors compared this emerging theoretical perspective, called the “relational 
view”, to the well-established industry structure view and the resource-based view 
(table 1).  
 
TABLE 1 
Comparing the Industry Structure, Resource-Based,  
and Relational Views of Competitive Advantage 
 
Source: Dyer and Singh, 1998 : 674 
The former perspective considers the industry as main unit of analysis and 
determinant of competitive advantage (Porter, 1980). Scholars from the industry 
perspective believe that relative bargaining power and collusion are the primary sources 
of supernormal profit returns. Preservation of competitive advantage is achieved 
Dimensions Industry Structure View Resource-Based View Relational View
Unit of analysis Industry Firm Dyad of network of firms
Primary sources of 
supernormal profits
Relative bargaining power
Collusion
Scarce physical resources: (e.g., 
land, raw material inputs)
Relation-specific investments
Human resources/know-how (e.g., 
managerial talent)
Interfirm knowledge-sharing 
routines
Technological resources (e.g., 
process technology)
Complementary resources 
endowments
Financial Resources Effective Governance
Intangible Resources (e.g. 
reputational)
Dyadic/Network Barriers to 
imitation
Causal ambiguity
Mechanism that preserve 
profits
Industry barriers to entry:
Government regulations
Production economies/sunk costs
Firm-level barriers to imitation
Resource scarcity/property rights
Causal ambiguity
Time compression diseconomies
Asset stock interconnectedness
Time compression diseconomies
Interorganizational asset stock 
interconnectedness
Partner scarcity
Resource indivisibility
Institutional environment
Ownership control of rent-
generating 
process/resources
Collective (with competitors) Individual firm Collective (with trading partners)
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through industry barriers to entry, such as government regulations and production 
economies. For the industry view the control of rent-generation is collective. The latter 
perspective instead concentrates on how individual firms obtain supernormal returns 
leveraging on internal resources (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1984, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) 
and capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). Firms sustain their competitive 
advantage through barriers to imitation, derived from (1) Resource scarcity; (2) 
Property rights; (3) Causal ambiguity; (4) Time compression diseconomies; (5) Asset 
stock interconnectedness. The relational view argues instead “that a firm's critical 
resources may span firm boundaries and may be embedded in interfirm routines and 
processes” (Dyer and Singh, 1998 : 661). The two scholars affirm that supernormal 
profits, defined as relational rents, depend on (1) Relation-specific investments (2) 
Interfirm knowledge-sharing routines; (3) Complementary resource and capability 
endowments; (4) Effective governance mechanisms. Competitiveness is defended via 
Dyadic/network barriers to imitation. Indivisibility of joint investments and partner 
scarcity, among others, are the main guarantors for preserving supernormal rents. 
According to Williamson (1985), the authors affirm that asset specificity avoids 
opportunism and promotes trust. Since both partners invest in transaction specific 
assets, both partners control rents generation and sharing. Dyer and Singh’s work 
framed the boundaries of an emerging fashion in management literature. Indeed, prior 
works had already started to adopt a relational perspective (Dyer, 1996a; Dyer, 1996b; 
Hamel, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Peteraf, 1994; Powell et al., 1996; Teece, 1986; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Zander and Kogut, 1995). However, as Dyer and Singh 
pointed out, “they have tended to focus on one particular benefit associated with 
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collaboration, such as learning, lower transaction costs or pooling of resources” (1998 : 
661). After Dyer and Singh’s article, relational view scholars started to adopt a wider 
standpoint that considered the different relevant aspects concerning firm alliances. 
Table 1 reports some of the most cited works contributing to the relational view. Our 
literature analysis showed that, in management literature, scholars have addressed the 
relational perspective in several ways. The first mainly relates to the interpretation of 
alliances, defined as “any voluntarily initiated cooperative agreement between firms that 
involved exchange, sharing, or co-development, and it can include contributions by 
partners of capital, technology, or firm-specific assets, including information and 
knowledge” (Gulati and Singh, 1998 : 781). Scholars mostly focus their observation on 
partnering effects on focal firms that are embedded in one or more alliances. Scholars 
have developed analysis in several industries and their samples included firms in every 
position of the value chain. In fact, alliances may be established for example between 
suppliers and buyers, different buyers or even between competitors. Among these 
studies, Gulati (1999) showed that relational capabilities speed up the lead firm’s 
knowledge access and transfer, fostering company growth and innovation. Kale, Dyer 
and Singh (2002) demonstrated that investing in a specific alliance function within 
firms boundaries positively affects stock market gains in the short run and increases the 
likelihood of alliance success in the long run. Also, Kale et al. affirmed that the initial 
stock market response to a key event positively correlates to the long-term performance 
and value of the event. Gulati, Lavie and Singh (2009) specified two kinds of partnering 
experiences: (1) partner-specific and (2) general partnering. Their results showed that 
firm-specific and relation-specific factors influence the impact of accumulated 
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partnering experience on the possible gains of the alliance. Another branch of 
contributions focused on relations among firms that have commercial relations along 
the supply chain, i.e. in principal buyers and suppliers. In this branch of research 
scholars have looked at dyads or ego-networks where a focal firm (e.g. Toyota, Honda, 
IBM) deals with a variable number of suppliers. These studies have utilized a more 
fine-grained analysis, based on processes and routines underpinning relational 
capabilities. Working for the same supply chain, these firms are most of the time part of 
the same industry. The contributions are concentrated on medium-technology or high-
technology industries, such as automobiles (Dyer, 1996a; Dyer, 1996b; Dyer and Chu, 
2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) or motorcycles (Mintzberg et al., 1996; Pascale, 1996), 
packaging (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999), semiconductors (Stuart, 2000), and others. 
Scholars have furthered our understanding of relational rents generation and the 
connection between relational capabilities and performance. Yet aside from the relevant 
advances for research, this part of literature still contains biases and limitations. The 
first problem is a selective focus on one of the firms involved in the relation. In many 
cases, scholars have favored a focal-firm perspective that is based on the analysis of the 
buyer or assembler. For example, Dyer and Nobeoka examine Toyota’s skills in 
managing a knowledge-sharing network of suppliers and their (successful) attempt to be 
more effective in knowledge variety generation than firms that do not rely on network 
structures. Along these lines, Lorenzoni and Lipparini develop a longitudinal study 
about four leading Italian firms in the packaging industry (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999), showing how the integration of internal and external knowledge emerges as a 
distinctive organizational capability. Dyer and Hatch (2006) wonder if it is possible for 
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a firm leveraging on supply networks to reach a competitive advantage although its 
competitors purchase the same components from the same suppliers. Basing their study 
on a comparative analysis between Toyota and a group of US automakers, the authors 
show that Toyota performs better thanks to higher levels of knowledge sharing and 
coordination. Focusing on assemblers’ decisions and performance emerges as a 
common trait in this stream of literature. However, singling out one agent when 
observing a dyad or a group provides an unbalanced perception of the unit of analysis 
and can result in an incomplete picture of competitive dynamics. Then why did scholars 
choose to concentrate their attention on one part of the network only?  
First, in medium-technology and even high-technology industries, the assemblers 
have been playing a prominent role for decades. They drove the innovation processes by 
controlling the whole product design and by outsourcing only basic manufacturing to 
external players. For example, in automotive supply chains, the automaker would 
design the entire vehicle and coordinate the integration of the different part suppliers. 
Under these conditions, the so-called “core” firms intuitively represent the most 
interesting player within the relation. Their primary role in capability development is a 
good reason to justify scholars’ interest. However, the increasing international 
competition that affected the majority of markets has accelerated technological 
development. Markets have become hypercompetitive (D'Aveni and Gunther, 1994; 
Ilinitch, D'Aveni and Lewin, 1996), and innovation demand has increased 
tremendously. As products became more complex, core firms have struggled to control 
innovation processes as a whole. According to literature, they started to progressively 
rely on their strategic suppliers to develop innovations.  
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Suppliers have developed skills to innovate single parts or components, while 
assemblers have become knowledge integrators, leveraging on product modularity 
(Brusoni et al., 2001). In several cases, suppliers’ high degree of specialization has 
pushed different OEM firms to rely on the same partners for their supplies. For instance, 
Takeishi (2001) and Dyer and Hatch (2006) reported that different assemblers tend to 
share the same supply network and, hence, attempt to outperform competitors through 
coordination and knowledge sharing capabilities rather than supplier selection. This 
dependency caused by supplier specialization has affirmed the pivotal role of suppliers 
in innovation processes and relational rents generation.  
The second reason why many scholars explore the core rather than the periphery is 
the availability of data. It is easier to retrieve reliable data on a buyer or an assembler, 
rather than data related to suppliers. Peripheral firms are usually smaller and mostly 
unknown to the ‘general public’. We probably know which company manufactured our 
car, but we rarely know who manufactured the brakes or the chassis. Media, academia, 
and the general public talk rather about the big and successful firms than about the 
small and little known firms. Therefore, data about focal firms are not only easier to 
find, but also richer and more detailed. Moreover, peripheral firms are often privately 
owned and small sized (Gomes-Casseres, 1997), which implies less hierarchical and 
organizational structure, less codification of knowledge and past activities, and thus less  
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economic data available. Scholars may find it frustratingly difficult to retrieve data 
about these firms. Finally, convincing readers and reviewers that a small, unstructured, 
and probably unknown organization deserves academic attention is not a trivial task. 
Although literature has, in some cases, underlined the importance of these firms 
(Cooper et al., 1986), the lack of incentives may have led to a neglect of peripheral 
firms in scholarly works.  
 
WHY SHOULD RESEARCH STUDY PERIPHERAL FIRMS? 
Suppliers are deeply different from buyers and assemblers. Hence, the so-called 
peripheral firms need to be addressed with special attention because of their specific 
nature. Due to this fact, operations management literature, among others, has been 
dedicating specific attention not only to buyers’ strategies in suppliers selection and 
management (Sarkis and Talluri, 2002; Spekman, 1988), but also to suppliers’ internal 
organization and strategy. Scholars in this field have been developing specific works 
about suppliers, especially in the last twenty years. For example, Choi and Krause 
defined the concept of  “supply base” through three dimensions: (1) Number of 
suppliers; (2) Degree of differentiation; (3) Level of inter-relationships among the 
suppliers involved. Through a qualitative analysis they provide a set of propositions 
explaining the relation between the supply base complexity and both suppliers and focal 
firms performance. Specifically, while on the one hand reducing the supply base, 
complexity decreases costs and increases responsiveness at the supplier level, on the 
other hand it also has also a negative impxact on supply risk, supply innovation, and 
therefore core firms’ competitiveness. Forker (1997) affirmed that a supplier’s quality 
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performance is conditioned on the way the supplier addresses effectiveness and 
efficiency in process optimization. Conversely to what relational view scholars stated, 
Forker affirmed that investments in asset specificity between buyer and suppliers lead to 
“poorer component quality and higher transaction costs for the customer firm, above 
and beyond poor performance determined strictly by the suppliers’ quality management 
practices” (1997 : 263). Suppliers tend to decrease component quality when they 
believe that the buyer’s supplier selection is guaranteed or in the case that 
resource/material prices increase. Choi and Hong (2002) investigate how supply 
network structure develops over time. Basing their propositions on three automotive 
ego-networks (Honda, Acura, and Daymler-Chrysler), the authors advocate that after 
the first “kick-off” determined by the final assembler’s first-tier suppliers selection, the 
supply network takes shape on its own. Evidence showed that core firms maintain 
effective control over the first-tier supplier, but they have little knowledge about what 
happens beyond the first level of suppliers. Among several policies that control a supply 
networks, the authors particularly focus on cost-cutting requirements, which lead to 
rigidity and a sense of iniquity at the supplier level, when these requirements are overly 
formalized. Along these lines, Choi, Dooley, and Rungtusanatham (2001) affirm that 
assemblers forcing a high level of control in the supply network determine worse 
performances in innovation and flexibility at the supplier level. However, too few 
planning negatively affects managerial forecasting and the establishment of work 
routines. In this work, Choi and colleagues affirm that networks are mostly fortuitous 
structures rather than the outcome of a singular entity’s conscious design. The authors 
define the supply network as a complex adaptive systems: this result underlines the 
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importance of looking at suppliers not as mere pawns in the chess game of a 
strategizing buyer, but rather as distinctive organizations that define their competitive 
actions and strategies independently. Scholars of operations management have also 
turned their attention to comparative studies of firms at different positions in the supply 
network architecture. Choi and Hartley (1996) demonstrate that assemblers, suppliers, 
and indirect suppliers place the same importance to consistency (defined as the 
combination of quality and delivery), reliability, relationship, flexibility, price, and 
service. However, the two scholars have found statistically significant differences 
between assemblers and indirect suppliers in regard to the relevance they attributed to 
technological capability and financial issues. Despite this clear-cut results of operations 
management scholars, only few strategic management researchers have started to 
explore suppliers as a specific unit of analysis, which differ from buyers and 
assemblers. Among those, Clark and Fujimoto advanced a classification of strategic 
suppliers based on traditional automotive typologies (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). The 
three-type classification represents the kind of control that suppliers have over the parts 
they manufacture, which are: (1) Supplier proprietary parts; (3) Black box parts; (2) 
Detail-controlled parts (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991 : 140-143). Supplier proprietary parts 
are standard generic products that suppliers produce and sell to the assemblers mostly 
via a catalogue. Core firms select these off-the-shelf parts mainly looking for the lowest 
price. Since these components have no personalization, assemblers have no control on 
the manufacturing system that suppliers use. Clark and Fujimoto’s data reveals that 
within the automotive industry supplier proprietary parts account for less than 10% of 
the total vehicle cost. Black-box parts result from a co-development between assembler 
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and supplier. While the former provides general indications on modular architecture, 
exterior shapes, cost-performance requirements, and other basic information, the latter 
follows detailed design and engineering requirements for the manufacturing of the total 
product. Black-box parts allow suppliers to develop innovation and engineering skills, 
while assemblers attain a bigger control and customization of the part production. When 
assemblers’ part in the engineering process is slightly more relevant, researchers use the 
term “grey-box”. Detail-controlled parts imply an assemblers’ tight control on supplier 
activity. In this scenario, customization is high and core firms are the proprietary of 
most of the engineering technology. This solution allows suppliers to maintain total 
control over design and quality of strategic components while preserving bargaining 
power toward supplier’s part pricing. Kaufman et al. (2000) criticized Clark and 
Fujimoto’s classification, affirming that (1) It focuses only on dyadic relations between 
supplier and OEM manufacturer; (2) It considers small and medium suppliers as passive 
and minor agents in the relation; and (3) It provides a non-theory based taxonomy rather 
than a systematic theory-grounded typology (Kaufman et al., 2000 : 650-651). Drawing 
from transaction cost economics literature, Kaufman et al. advance a supplier typology 
of four types based on two dimensions: (1) collaboration and (2) technology. The 
authors define Commodity Suppliers as those having little technology and little interest 
in collaborations. These firms compete in cost-cutting and low prices, proposing 
standard products with little or no differentiation. Collaboration Specialists have a great 
degree of involvement in partnerships with their customers, but they provide only low-
technology components. They are similar to Clark and Fujimoto’s detail-controlled part 
suppliers. Technology Specialists are similar to proprietary parts suppliers (Clark and 
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Fujimoto, 1991), because they provide highly technological components without 
engaging in collaborative relations. Their competitive advantage is based on their 
proprietary knowledge, which they exploit through first-mover advantage, continuous 
innovation, and high barriers to imitation. In fact, they isolate their activities to avoid 
possible leaks of knowledge that could benefit competitors and customers. Problem 
Solving Suppliers, just like black-box parts suppliers, provide high-tech solutions 
through intense collaborations. However, their work flows into small production 
batches, using their advantage in labor flexibility and process flexibility. Although 
Kaufman and colleagues advance a contribution that is tailored to the supplier 
perspective, their article contains a major limitation. As the authors themselves stated 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991 : 660), the taxonomy is static and it provides no longitudinal 
interpretation of how suppliers’ strategies change with exogenous and endogenous 
variations. Some other recent contributions in strategic management literature tried to 
provide specific insights on supplier dynamics. For example Kang, Mahoney, and Tan 
wonder why some weak OEM suppliers are willing to make unilateral specific 
investments, which place them in a risky bargaining position (2009 : 120). Williamson 
(1991) provides a micro-analytic solution, affirming that firms tend to anticipate 
potential dependencies from external players by employing a specific organizational 
response. Drawing on prior research (Mayer, 2006), the authors of this study 
demonstrate that OEM suppliers face asset specificity hazards, if they benefit from 
inter-project knowledge spillovers and reputation spillovers. To conclude, suppliers 
reshape competition and cooperation through their innovativeness and their partnerships 
with external organizations (Cooper et al., 1986; Gomes-Casseres, 2006; Stuart, 2000). 
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TOWARD A PERIPHERAL VIEW:  
PATHS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
So far we have described how operations management scholars have been dedicating 
more specific attention to supplier dynamics than management scholars. Although 
relational view researchers have clearly pointed toward the unique contribution of 
supply firms to the dyad/network value creation (see for an example Stuart, 2000), 
scholars have failed to provide a balanced analysis. They also have almost completely 
neglected peripheral firm role, considering them nearly passive agents. However, since 
some management scholars have first started to question the buyers and assemblers’ 
primary role in supply chain value creation (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni et al., 
2001), literature has consequently started to consider suppliers as active strategizing 
agents (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Kang et al., 2009; Kaufman et al., 2000). Although 
we do not deny the importance of analyzing suppliers’ contribution to core firm strategy 
and performance (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Lorenzoni and 
Baden Fuller, 1995; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Takeishi, 2001), we see a relevant 
set of specific supplier-based studies slowly emerging from management journals. 
Therefore, we believe that in order to address this topic, scholars should reflect on 
viable future theoretical approaches, methods, and research questions. Here we advance 
our suggestions based on a critical analysis of former theory. 
According to relational view definitions, suppliers’ commercial and technological 
relations influence their economic and innovation performance. Scholars have mostly 
focused their attention on suppliers’ contribution to buyer and assembler value creation. 
However, suppliers’ competitiveness is important for the success of the entire network. 
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Hence, it would be interesting to deepen the analysis of factors that improve suppliers’ 
performance. We assume that a peripheral firm in “good health” can better perform its 
role and activities within its environment. For example, suppliers suffer the increasing 
convergence of cost-cutting, which limits their profits and, hence, the possibility to 
invest in challenging innovations. For example, North American and European textile 
suppliers have struggled to compete with Far-East supply firms’ price reductions. As a 
consequence, several textile companies have recently re-located their production to 
China and India, in order to access lower labor cost. However, the intense focus on 
efficiency has slowed down the technological development of textiles, decreasing the 
average quality of products sold to fashion firms. Accordingly, scholars have uttered 
concerns about assemblers leveraging on their stronger bargaining power to put 
suppliers under pressure. In several cases, evidence showed that continuous and 
exaggerated pressure for efficiency led to counter-productive results and lower 
performance (Kang et al., 2009). Since relational rents depend on both partners’ 
performance, relational view scholars should not only ask what suppliers can do to 
contribute to assemblers’ success, but also what assemblers can do to contribute to 
suppliers’ success. This scenario indirectly maximizes assembler profits as well. 
According to the literature supporting an active interpretation of suppliers’ dynamics, 
we believe that management scholars should analyze supply capabilities development at 
the peripheral level. Several questions still warrant answers concerning suppliers’ 
competitive strategies. For example, do suppliers develop specific capabilities due to 
their position in the network structure? And, if so, what is the role of first-tier suppliers 
compared to firms that are at different stages of the value chain (i.e. second and third 
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tier)? What kind of governance at the supplier level triggers knowledge acquisition? 
What kinds of investments reduce default risk at the suppliers level? Are these 
conditioned by industry technological development? Do relational capabilities 
developed between first-tier supplier and assembler affect those developed between a 
first-tier and a second-tier supplier? What about the opposite? Are specific network 
positions related to different approaches to asset specificity? To respond to these and 
other questions, strategic management scholars can rely on the greater amount of results 
provided in operations management literature. However, while the former usually focus 
on higher level constructs, such a organizational architectures, combinative skills, 
strategic decisions, and dynamic capabilities, the latter mostly observe lower level 
actions such as purchases, transformation of raw materials into finished goods, storage 
efficiency, sales, delivery, and customer satisfactions. We believe that results extracted 
from operations management studies are complementary to the recent strategic 
management scholars’ intent to focus on microfoundations of capabilities. These 
microfoundations of capabilities are defined as “the distinct skills, processes, 
procedures, organizational structures, decision rules, and disciplines—which undergird 
enterprise-level sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring capacities” (Teece, 2007 : 1319).  
As far as method and data are concerned, we have already underlined how, due to 
their nature, retrieving data about suppliers is usually harder than collecting information 
about core firms. Most small and privately-owned firms have simpler systems of 
financial, economical, and performance reporting, while public firms have to develop 
reports and make data available to shareholders and stakeholders. Within firm 
boundaries, knowledge is mostly tacit and uncodified. Still, gathering meaningful and 
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extensive data remains a touchstone for any good piece of research, and scholars have to 
learn how to leverage on the positive aspects that are typical of supply firms. For 
example, although suppliers have often less precise and codified performance 
assessments, OEM customers rate their suppliers through well-established evaluation 
forms that they develop to support their partner selection. Former studies are useful 
examples of how to successfully use those datasets (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Takeishi, 
2001). When suppliers are family-owned businesses, it is possible to interview people 
who have been involved for long parts of the firm’s history, or at least somebody that is 
aware of details such as entrepreneurial motivations underpinning strategic decisions. 
Starting from these facts and interpretations, scholars may develop in-depth case studies 
leading to novel grounded theory. Furthermore, longitudinal insights may be the 
building blocks for dynamic process interpretations to shed light not only on factors 
affecting competitive advantage at supplier level, but also on how to sustain success 
when exogenous conditions change. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main thesis of this article was that it is impossible to fully understand how dyads 
and networks of firms compete through unbalanced and biased studies that concentrate 
on the core firm of a partnership. Since competition between pairs and groups of firms 
is becoming more and more common (Dyer and Singh, 1998 : 675), focusing on 
unbalanced research may limit the explanatory power of relational studies. Firms 
organize in strategic networks, which are mostly built around a firm that literature 
commonly defines as focal/core firm or assembler/buyer. The other firms within the 
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network are called peripheral firms and they principally supply parts and services to 
focal firms. Although relational view scholars affirm the importance of understanding 
peripheral firms in order to explain their contribution to the core firm as well as to the 
network as a whole, strategic management studies have mainly concentrated their 
attempts on explaining focal firms’ activities and performances. According to a wide set 
of studies that developed within the operations management theory, suppliers offer 
specific characteristics due to their nature, position within the network, and bargaining 
power. Therefore, we cannot assume that implications for general firms or focal firms 
always apply to for peripheral firms as well. As a result, a supplier-specific literature 
has emerged from operations management theory. In this way, strategic management 
scholars have developed some analysis of supply organizations principally considering 
their development via external ties.  
The peripheral view we offer here extends the relational view considerations on 
suppliers’ role and suggests the reconsideration of suppliers’ importance in explaining 
both supplier performance and contribution to other players. In addition, we 
provocatively suggested turning the traditional perspective upside-down, analyzing the 
assemblers’ policies, strategies and governance supporting the suppliers’ value creation 
and performance. In future research, scholars should explicitly examine supplier 
characteristics in greater detail. Further research might explain the establishment and 
effects of supplier-based capabilities and how they change depending on the specific 
industry, technological development, and tier level.  
In conclusion, by promoting the peripheral view of manufacturing networks we 
emphasize the primary goal of our study, which is to re-balance the focus on a 
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fascinating area of research that explains how dyads and groups sustain competitive 
advantage over time.  
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FRAMING THE STRATEGIC PERIPHERIES: 
A NOVEL TYPOLOGY OF SUPPLIERS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper contributes to the emerging theoretical perspective called the “peripheral 
view of the network” by proposing an innovative typology of strategic suppliers. Data 
collected through a longitudinal multiple-case study of eighteen firms in the Italian 
motorcycle part industry presents a four-type classification of suppliers based on two 
relation-based dimensions: asset specificity – proxy for relational capabilities – and 
strategic focus – proxy for operational ambidexterity. Four types of peripheries emerge: 
(1) Niche Suppliers (low asset specificity – narrow strategic focus); (2) Flexible 
Suppliers (low asset specificity – wide strategic focus); (3) Committed Suppliers (high 
asset specificity – narrow strategic focus); (4) Multi-Purpose Suppliers (high asset 
specificity – wide strategic focus). Results suggest that different levels of relational 
capabilities correspond to diverse positioning in the industry and thus reveal different 
types of competitive strategy. Nine theoretical propositions state how the interplay 
between relational capabilities and operational flexibility affects peripheries’ 
competitive advantage. 
 
 
Keywords: Suppliers; Typology; Peripheral View; Asset Specificity; Strategic Focus. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, scholars of the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) have explored 
how firms leverage on strategic partnerships to outperform competitors and obtain 
sustained competitive advantage. Within this theoretical perspective, scholars have 
focused principally on core or focal firms (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Pascale, 1996). In 
manufacturing networks, scholars have traditionally defined original equipment 
manufacturers (OEM) as core/focal firms, due to their (1) network centrality, (2) 
superior bargaining power, (3) primary role in innovation development, and (4) 
coordination capabilities of network resources. However, scholarship affirms that, due 
to the increasing complexity of products and technologies, the locus of innovation has 
shifted from core firms to peripheral firms, which traditionally scholars identify with 
part/component suppliers (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith and Anderson, 2002; Powell, 
Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996). When technological demand rises, OEMs struggle to 
drive the innovation of finished products. Hence, they start relying on a selection of 
strategic suppliers, which have developed superior capabilities in component 
innovation. While suppliers develop innovation through the introduction of new 
components, OEMs’ develop specific skills in supplier selection and integration of 
technical knowledge. Accordingly, scholars use the term “assembler” or “buyer” to 
define OEMs. Since suppliers are quickly becoming the primary source of innovation, 
studies focusing on core firms fail to explain the processes underpinning innovation and 
thus generate misleading theory. Although strategic management scholars have often 
described suppliers’ distinctive dynamics and characteristics (Gottfredson, Puryear and 
Phillips, 2005; Kaufman, Wood and Theyel, 2000; Lipparini and Sobrero, 1994; 
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Takeishi, 2001), few works have observed them through a tailored analytical lens. 
While operations management scholars have already shed light on suppliers’ activities 
(Choi and Krause, 2006; Forker, 1997; Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart and Kerwood, 
2004; Wu and Choi, 2005), strategic management scholars have only recently started to 
pay attention to peripheral firms, their nature (Kaufman et al., 2000) and their 
contribution to core firms’ value creation (Dyer and Hatch, 2006). By proposing a 
dynamic typology of strategic suppliers, our study nurtures an emerging stream of 
literature focusing on peripheral firms, which we have identified and called the 
“peripheral view of manufacturing networks”. Leveraging data collected through a 
multiple-case study of eighteen firms in the Italian motorcycle part industry, we present 
a four-type suppliers’ classification based on two dimensions concerning their relations 
with original equipment manufacturers (OEM). Data shows that different relational 
capabilities are connected to diverse positioning within the industry, and, thus, different 
types of competitive advantage. Continuous interactions with OEMs help suppliers to 
diversify their activities and to offer a niche service that is differs from that of their 
competitors. Therefore, increasing relations in a suppliers’ network positively affects 
heterogeneity between peripheral firms. Also, our longitudinal analysis describes how 
firms tend to adapt their positioning in response to environmental changes and market 
shocks. We developed a thorough observation of suppliers’ dynamics, which we 
summeed up through a set of theoretical propositions.  
Our study develops as follows. Firstly, we present the theoretical background 
underpinning our research. Then we develop a theoretical typology of suppliers based 
on relational characteristics and firm performance. Secondly, we present the method we 
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used and the data we collected to advance our theoretical propositions. Thirdly, we 
describe the empirical field, its history and main players. Fourthly, through a 
longitudinal analysis that covers 65 years, we study how suppliers’ positioning affected 
their competitiveness. Great attention is dedicated to the interaction between core firms 
and peripheries. Finally, we briefly sum up our theoretical contribution and highlight a 
set of managerial implications. Also, we point out the limitations of our work and 
provide an agenda for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Strategic and operations management scholars have focused their attention on the 
importance of seeking the reasons for sustained competitive advantage not only within 
individual firms, but also between networks of firms (Dyer, 1996b; Hansen, Hoskisson, 
Lorenzoni and Ring, 1997; Kamath and Liker, 1990, 1994; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999; Nishiguchi, 1994; Zhao, Anand and Mitchell, 2005). The relational view (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998) shows how firms leverage ties and alliances to strategically develop 
knowledge (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Gulati, 1995b, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; Zander and Kogut, 1995; Zhao and Anand, 2009), 
control unique resources and capabilities (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1990), and benefit from renewable rents to outperform competitors. Scholars 
have mainly focused on ego-networks (Ahuja, 2000), which are based on the analysis of 
core/focal firms. However, as products become more complex and technological 
demand rises, core firms struggle to drive innovation of finished products. Therefore, 
they progressively delegate component innovation to a selection of strategic suppliers, 
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which have become the new innovation leaders. Core firms’ compete developing skills 
in supplier selection (Dyer, 1996a) and knowledge integration (Brusoni, Prencipe and 
Pavitt, 2001). Since scholars demonstrated that the assembler-supplier relation has 
changed (Asanuma, 1989a) and the locus of innovation has shifted from 
assemblers/buyers to suppliers (Powell et al., 1996), we suggest that focusing primarily 
on core firms fails to fully capture the relational processes underpinning innovation. We 
believe that supply firms deserve specific analysis and ad hoc theory, but while 
operation management scholarship has shown that suppliers have a different nature 
from buyers and assemblers, and therefore require a specific approach (Choi, Dooley 
and Rungtusanatham, 2001; Choi and Hong, 2002; Choi, Wu, Ellram and Koka, 2002; 
Forker, 1997), only few strategic management studies have attempted to develop 
contributions aimed at understanding suppliers’ distinctive nature (Clark and Fujimoto, 
1991; Kaufman et al., 2000). To fill this gap, we suggest the adoption of a tailored 
theoretical perspective that we call the “peripheral view of manufacturing networks”. 
We define the peripheral view as the supplier-based theoretical approach that explains 
the antecedents of relational rents. Since strategic management theory about suppliers is 
still at a preliminary stage, we believe that research should first clearly define peripheral 
firms. Therefore, our study develops a dynamic supplier classification that sheds light 
on peripheral firms’ nature and competitive behaviors. But what do we mean when we 
use the term “classification”? Classification is traditionally considered one of the most 
generic and central conceptual exercises underpinning advanced reasoning, 
mathematics, statistics, and data analysis (Bailey, 1994). This is why classification 
schemes have gained great popularity in developing analytical frameworks to 
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understand firm performance (see for example the classification schemes of Hambrick, 
1983; Hatten and Hatten, 1985; Miles and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980). Scholars affirm 
that classifications based on theoretically grounded dimensions are a viable option for 
robust definitions of a complex and heterogeneous group of actors, such as suppliers 
(Kaufman et al., 2000). Although some strategic management studies have described 
supplier classification, they present some limitations that inhibit a complete 
understanding of peripheral firms’ role. For example, Clark and Fujimoto (1991 : 140-
143) present an automotive supplier taxonomy, based on three types of categories: (1) 
Black-box parts; (2) Detail-controlled parts; (3) Supplier-proprietary parts. Supplier-
proprietary parts are standard generic products that suppliers produce and sell to the 
assemblers mostly via a catalogue. Core firms’ purchase selection is mainly dependent 
on price convenience. In the case of supplier-proprietary parts, assemblers have no 
control over the manufacturing system that suppliers use, because these components 
have no customization. Black-box parts, on the contrary, result from a assembler-
supplier joint venture. While the core firm develops modular architectures, exterior 
shapes, cost-performance requirements, and other basic information, the peripheral 
firms follow detailed design and engineering requirements for the manufacturing of the 
total product. Black-box parts allow suppliers to develop innovation and engineering 
skills, while assemblers attain a bigger control and customization of the part production. 
When assemblers’ part in the engineering process is slightly more relevant, researchers 
use the term “grey-box”. Detail-controlled parts imply an assemblers’ strict control on 
supplier activity. In this case, customization is high and core firms own most of the 
engineering technology. This solution allows suppliers to keep total control over design 
 42 
and quality of strategic components while preserving bargaining power toward 
suppliers’ part pricing. Although Clark and Fujimoto provide some preliminary 
definition of suppliers, their research presents some limitations. First, it focuses on a 
single-link connection between an automaker and a supplier. Conversely, other studies 
within the automotive industry (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Takeishi, 2001) describe that 
strategic suppliers often work with several assemblers at the same time, which affects 
their capabilities and ambidexterity. Secondly, their study considers suppliers as passive 
players, neglecting their active role in innovation development and their influence over 
the assembly firms and the entire industry. Thirdly, the work is tightly industry-specific 
– automotive – , and it does not allow wider theoretical generalizations. Fourthly, the 
representation is static and it does not provide a longitudinal process analysis. Kaufman 
and colleagues’ work (2000) also present similar problems. With their four-quadrants 
typology (based on the level of collaboration and technology) the Kaufman et al. 
provide a more realistic interpretation of the active role of strategic suppliers. Their 
quantitative techniques and the use of a multi-industry sample allow a wider 
generalization of the results. However, the static cross-sectional analysis fails to provide 
any process interpretation of suppliers’ competitive behavior. As the authors stated in 
the conclusion of their study “researchers may want to create a longitudinal database 
and develop case studies to determine whether a transitional pattern exists for firms 
between different quadrants of the typology” (Kaufman et al., 2000 : 660). Accordingly, 
our work contributes to the peripheral view by offering a process theory based on a 
dynamic classification of suppliers in manufacturing networks. Although different from 
the classification we reviewed (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Kaufman et al., 2000), our 
 43 
work is still based on conceptual ties derived from theory (Miller, Friesen and 
Mintzberg, 1984 : 31-36). 
Literature presents two forms of classification: taxonomies and typologies. The 
former is primarily empirical and uncovers theoretically unsupported clusters. The latter 
concentrates on the construction and verification of conceptual schemes with multiple 
theoretical dimensions (Kaufman et al., 2000). We chose the second approach due to 
several reasons. First, peripheral view’s goal is to advance theoretically supported 
definitions about supply firms. A well-constructed typology may help to bring order to 
chaos by interpreting a complex reality, clustering along few relevant dimensions that 
have been already tested in management literature. Second, typologies enable the 
construction of gestalts – a symbolic configuration of inseparable elements – since each 
type is an entire unit of attributes. A typology of strategic suppliers thus provides an 
exhaustive array of types that allows ascertaining the strategic positioning of suppliers. 
Third, once identified, types may be used as foundations for further research and theory 
development. Our types of strategic peripheries can be tested and expanded by relating 
them to performance figures or using them as a basis for strategic advice. Finally, 
taxonomies rely on statistical techniques, such as cluster analysis, that are inherently 
static. This counteracts the second aim of this paper: to demonstrate movements across 
classification types in a longitudinal perspective and to show empirically proven 
dynamics across classification types.  
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FRAMING A RELATIONAL TYPOLOGY  
OF STRATEGIC PERIPHERIES  
A typology is no better than the dimensions or theoretical constructs on which it is 
based. To ascertain that our classification is founded on key factors we rely on two 
dimensions derived from literature on strategic and operations management: assets 
specificity and strategic focus. Both of them are proxies for relational capabilities 
developed through partnerships with core firms.  
 
Asset Specificity 
Williamson defined asset specificity as durable investments undertaken in support of 
particular transactions (Williamson, 1985 : 55). Then, Nishiguchi identified (1) Site, (2) 
Physical, (3) Human, and (4) Dedicated asset specificity as four distinct dimensions of 
the construct (Nishiguchi, 1994). For a supplier, site specificity implies developing joint 
infrastructures with a specific partner, such as co-locating manufacturing facilities, 
R&D centers or exclusive experimental labs (i.e. customers trial centers). These 
solutions are aimed at minimizing inventory, transportation, and coordination costs 
(Dyer, 1996b). Physical asset specificity refers to relation-specific capital investments 
(e.g. in customized molds, tools, machinery, or even production lines). When suppliers 
customize processes and products, they achieve differentiation from competitors and 
support final product quality improvements by increasing the integrity and fit of single 
components (Nishiguchi, 1994). Human assets specificity refers to relation-specific 
know-how that dedicated supplier negotiators (e.g. engineers or technicians) acquire 
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through long-lasting interactions with the customer. Finally, dedicated asset specificity 
reflects additional investments in generalized production capacity to meet long-term 
partners’ special requirements. The intensity of asset specificity is a proxy to observe 
relationship quality (Ariño, De La Torre and Ring, 2001), type of interactions (Takeishi, 
2001), level of trust (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Dyer and Chu, 2000; Gulati, 1995a), 
and quality of capabilities developed between the dyads (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 
1999). Amit and Schoemaker affirmed that “strategic assets by their very nature are 
specialized” (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993 : 39) and this insight underlines/emphasizes 
that, by definition, firms must offer specialized or idiosyncratic services to gain 
competitive advantage. Firms outperform competitors thanks to relational-specific 
investments and thus generate assets that are unique when combined with those of the 
partner (Teece, 1987). In our context, investments in asset specificity are relevant for 
several reasons. First, as investments they are the result of a deliberate strategy, aimed 
at reinforcing relational capabilities and transforming commercial relations into 
cooperative projects; in short, they try to transform customers into partners. Second, 
they modify organizational routines at the supplier level. In fact, interacting with 
specific customers forces suppliers to change their habits and processes. Creating new 
routines not only cures organizational inertia (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982), but it also fosters the genesis of new capabilities.  
 
Strategic focus 
Strategic focus is defined as the ability of a single firm to deal with multiple types of 
activities at the same time (e.g. fostering innovation while keeping manufacturing cost 
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low). By monitoring changes in firms’ strategic focus, scholars can observe at the same 
time the suppliers’ strategic goal and flexibility in adapting to different goals. 
Scholarship has used various terms as synonyms of strategic focus: ambidexterity, 
specialization, organizational flexibility, and multitasking. Although they might have 
slightly different meaning depending on the contingent situation, they basically define 
the same capability. At the organization level, scholars observe strategic focus via the 
analysis of product range, geographic scopes, functional activities, and strategic goals 
that a firm simultaneously develops (Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart and Marangoni, 2003 : 
39). We can define firms “ambidextrous” when strategic focus is “wide”, that is when 
organizations are able to manage different types of activities at the same time (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004). On the other side, specialized firms narrow their strategic intent 
to a limited number of activities, trying to reach niche leadership. Scholars have 
discussed whether firm specialization accelerates learning. In accord with Adam 
Smith’s argument about specialization, some researchers believe that the learning rate 
should accelerate when narrow specialization is pursued (Smith, 1776). Others advocate 
that a wide focus positively affects learning performance (Schilling et al., 2003). In fact, 
the learning rate increases not only when players apply their efforts to different, 
although related, problem domains (Loewenstein, Thompson and Gentner, 1999), but 
also when learners take part in multiple activities that seem unrelated (Schilling et al., 
2003). Siding with this literature, we believe that although an intense specialization 
deepens a firm’s knowledge, a wide strategic focus more positively impacts other 
aspects like flexibility, knowledge absorption from heterogeneous domains/fields, and 
cognitive understanding. As Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004) affirmed, the pursuit of 
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multitasking is often a problematic issue, since a single decision may have implications 
for multiple performance goals and consequently may freeze managerial action when a 
trade-off favors one of the activities over the other. To deal with complexity, firms rely 
on managerial heuristics such as goal myopia, spatial differentiation, and temporal 
differentiation, because they mitigate the status-quo bias derived from the challenging 
trade-off (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004 : 16). Especially in customer-driven industries, 
organizations are pushed to accept a certain degree of trade-off, and therefore engage in 
different strategic tasks. Firms brave these contrasting requests, “and the most 
successful organizations reconcile them to a large degree, and in so doing enhance their 
long-term competitiveness” (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004 : 209). Market-oriented 
suppliers are able to effectively supply a larger portfolio of services, products, and 
technologies at the same time. Also, since peripheral firms often learn from their 
partners, supply firms attain wider strategic focus by engaging in cooperative relations 
with large and heterogeneous assemblers. One of the main antecedents of a wide 
strategic focus is the embeddedness in a localized network. Indeed, relational 
embeddedness fosters “adaptation” (Uzzi, 1996, 1997) through diffusion of tacit 
knowledge beyond firms’ boundaries, which supports the access to a strategic set of 
dynamic capabilities (Fleming, King and Juda, 2007). 
 
Firm Size 
By observing changes in firm size, scholars monitor a firm’s performance, its 
diversification, and its competitive behavior. However, it is problematic to define firm 
size and to measure it correctly. Firm size can be measured through several types of 
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data, such as number of employees, turnover, sales, and number of products in the 
portfolio. Kaufman and colleagues (2000) for example take a firms’ average number of 
employees as a proxy to define its size. However, in manufacturing networks this 
measurement is inconsistent due to the impact that machineries and automation has on 
firm productivity. For example, a supplier can increase size, despite a reduction in the 
number of employees, thanks to the adoption of automatic machineries. In other cases, 
scholars use “sales” as proxy of firm size when employees are not a consistent option. 
Still, firms’ size might not be directly comparable, even when they compete within the 
same NAICS code.1 In fact, sales can be very different from case to case, depending on 
the specific product manufactured. A big producer of buttons, for example, might be 
significantly smaller than a little fabric producer, although they both work for the textile 
industry. According to prior literature, these two companies are considered to be 
directly comparable. Hence, it is misleading to compare supply firm size in absolute 
terms. A viable solution is to benchmark suppliers that not only lie within the same 
industrial group, but also produce the same component for the same market (e.g. buttons 
producers should be compared to buttons producers only).  
 
The Matrix 
From our literature review, we have designed a four-quadrants matrix (Figure 1), 
which classifies the strategic suppliers through a relational perspective with core firms. 
This typology develops along two dimensions (asset specificity; strategic focus) and it 
                                                
1 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is a number used to specify to which 
industry a particular company belongs. It replaced the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 
system in 1997. 
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observes changes in firm size (represented by three bubble sizes). The two dimensions 
determine four strategic approaches. However, data revealed the presence of six 
different strategic approaches, since firms with narrow strategic focus can either be 
efficiency-based (white bubbles), which means that they concentrate on costs and waste 
reduction, or knowledge-based (grey bubbles), which indicates that peripheral firms 
seek continuous innovation both in products and the manufacturing process. We 
identified four clusters of peripheral firms: (1) Niche suppliers (low asset specificity – 
narrow strategic focus); (2) Flexible suppliers (low asset specificity – wide strategic 
focus); (3) Committed suppliers (high asset specificity – narrow strategic focus); (4) 
Multi-purpose suppliers (high asset specificity – wide strategic focus). 
 
Niche Suppliers 
Niche suppliers have low values in asset specificity and strategic focus. The former 
attribute indicates that these peripheries usually have low engagement in alliance 
development. The latter may lead to two divergent strategies and, consequently, two 
types of niche suppliers are identified: knowledge-based or efficiency-based. 
Knowledge-based suppliers are usually small, have highly educated or skilled human 
capital, and rare manufacturing delocalization. Their outputs often are beta-version 
components that core companies require in/for? competitive environments, where 
competitive advantage is achieved via disruptive innovations. Instead, efficiency-based 
suppliers are expected to concentrate on high volumes of standardized products. Since 
cost leadership represents these firms’ main competition strategy, innovation activities 
are  mainly  related  to  architectural  aspects,  and  they are aimed at reducing waste and  
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FIGURE 1 
Typology of Suppliers 
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optimizing efficiency (i.e. business project reengineering). Efficiency-based niche 
suppliers mostly sell their commodity products to generic customers. 
Assemblers/buyers select the needed components from a catalogue of standard products. 
Customization is minimal, or totally absent. However in industries where customization 
cannot be avoided, supplier engage in customized manufacturing, if customers’ orders 
are big enough to cover personalization costs. Since efficiency is particularly relevant, 
efficiency-based niche suppliers might undergo off-shoring and outsourcing strategies 
in countries with lower manufacturing costs. Since standardized production has lower 
profit margins, efficiency-based niche suppliers struggle to reach the positive effects of 
scale economies, while knowledge-based niche suppliers do not consider these effects 
such a relevant aspect. However both types of niche suppliers share the same moderate 
commitment on nurturing relationships through asset specificity. However, when niche 
suppliers decide to strengthen one aspect of the supplier-OEM alliance, investments in 
human capital are the most common option. For example, suppliers engage in dedicated 
trainings, periods of visiting, and they employ a certain teams of skilled workers to 
produce for some specific customers only. 
 
Flexible Suppliers 
Flexible suppliers are characterized by wide strategic focus and low asset specificity. 
Their multitasking skills allow them simultaneously to target efficiency and innovation. 
Flexible machineries, allowing for easy changeover between different production 
systems, generally support the manufacturing processes. Adopting flexible machinery 
also implies begin able to offer a wider range of manufacturing possibilities, thus 
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avoiding path dependencies derived from investments in asset specificity. It is crucial 
for flexible peripheries to explore new technological solutions as well as selecting the 
most promising ones to start serial production. However, flexible machineries often are 
more inefficient than dedicated production lines/plants, which might negatively affect 
time to delivery and manufacturing costs. Flexible suppliers’ core capabilities are 
distinctive skills in innovation selection, which they develop by market seizing (Teece, 
2007). The final goal of flexible suppliers is to lead innovation by proposing and 
establishing new technological standards. To pursue multiple goals, these suppliers 
adopt both spatial and temporal differentiation, which can be better performed by 
suppliers that are large (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004).  
 
Committed Suppliers 
Committed suppliers have high values in asset specificity and low values in strategic 
focus. Similar examples of these firms have previously been described in literature 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Kaufman et al., 2000). They often engage in strong relations 
with a limited number of customers, whom they leverage in order to jointly develop 
manufacturing supplies. Physical asset specificity and site specificity are frequent 
options for committed suppliers, since they force core firms to stick to the partnership. 
In fact, when core firms participate in capital-intensive joint investments, they have 
lower incentives toward opportunistic behaviors or frequent supplier switching. 
Sometimes core firms become so dependent on their strategic suppliers that they decide 
to partially or totally acquire them in order to have complete control over the 
manufacturing and innovation processes. After the acquisition, while some suppliers 
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start working exclusively for firms in their group, others maintain their own brand 
identity and continue to work with previous customers. This strategy is aimed at 
maximizing profits, increasing production, and saturating the machinery capacity to 
reach scale economies. High commitment toward relations requires an intense resource 
involvement – this is why committed suppliers generally deal with fewer customers 
than niche suppliers and flexible suppliers. They tend to customize their services, which 
can be either knowledge-based or efficiency-based, depending on the partners’ request. 
Flexible suppliers base their success on relational capabilities (Lipparini and Sobrero, 
1994), since a good level of interaction and trust determines equal distribution of 
relational rents, thus preventing opportunism (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale, Dyer and 
Singh, 2002) 
 
Multi-Purpose Suppliers 
Multi-Purpose Suppliers display both high commitment toward asset specificity and 
wide strategic focus. They are similar to what Clark and Fujimoto defined as suppliers 
for black-box parts (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991), or what Kaufmann et al. called 
problem-solvers (Kaufman et al., 2000 : 655). They compete in multi-market 
environments. Sometimes they are part of conglomerates or engaging in diversification 
ventures. Multi-purpose suppliers are very significant for core firm strategies, due to 
their advanced customized service and flexible response to market needs. This is why 
buyers and assemblers attempt to build strong alliances with them. Multi-purpose 
suppliers’ technological level and independence in design activities allow the core firms 
to outsource large portions of their work, which reduces design costs, production 
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investments, and capital risks. By delegating to multi-purpose suppliers, core firms can 
focus on basic design and combination of components for finished products. Also, as 
suppliers’ expertise develops, assemblers obtain higher efficiency with better design 
quality (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Multi-purpose suppliers rely on big scale 
economies and relevant structural dimensions to attain cycles of continuous product and 
process innovation. The multi-purpose suppliers’ capabilities usually focus on 
combinative skills, aimed at managing complexity, which is common in multitasking 
organizations with intense relational activities. Also, multi-purpose suppliers pay great 
attention to developing absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) by leveraging 
and assimilating knowledge flows between players of the network. Multi-purpose 
suppliers develop strategic internal functions to monitor and to correct the supplier’s 
diversification portfolio. To avoid slack of resources, they stop activities, which 
generate insufficient added value or profits.  
 
Scholars consider longitudinal approaches a suitable method to understand firms’ 
resource deployment and frame them thorough an evolutionary paths (Leonard-Barton, 
1990). This technique is particularly important when scholarship starts developing 
theory about a new field (Eisenhardt, 1989 : 548). Accordingly, while our typology has 
developed by critically reviewing of previous literature, we also observe the 
longitudinal evolution of the four types within an empirical context to attain further 
theoretical advances. In the next part of this paper, we analyze the evolution of a 
selected sample of suppliers over a time period of around 65 years. We develop a set of 
theoretical propositions that confirm the validity of the basic four-quadrants matrix and 
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provide new insights on firms’ strategic behavior and its effects on capabilities. 
 
METHOD AND DATA 
Sample 
Similarly to prior research (Mintzberg, Pascale, Goold and Rumelt, 1996; Pascale, 
1996; Wezel, 2005), we decided to develop our contributions analyzing the motorcycle 
industry. In particular, we have based our research on Italian motorcycle parts 
manufacturers. Scholars have considered the Italian motorcycle industry as a relevant 
empirical field to develop theory (Lipparini and Lorenzoni, 2005; Lipparini, Lorenzoni 
and Zollo, 2001; Muffatto and Panizzolo, 1996) because (1) It is characterized by 
different types of technologies; (2) Its innovation is developed through a network of 
strategic suppliers; (3) It is an international hypercompetitive market; (4) It is part of the 
automotive industry, which scholars have chosen when writing about the relational view 
(Among others see: Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Nishiguchi, 1994; 
Pascale, 1996; Takeishi, 2001). The Italian motorcycle industry is the biggest European 
network of two wheels vehicles production, and Italy is one of the most important 
markets in the global motorcycle industry with high national sales and exports. For 
2009, official data shows that Italy manufactured 55.49% of a total number of 859,518 
vehicles produced in Europe. Italy is also one of the focal areas for innovation 
development of high-tech motorcycles. Motorcycle manufacturers rely on a small 
network of local specialized suppliers, and since the majority of big motorcycle firms 
manufacture and design in Italy, they often share the same peripheries. Takeishi (2001) 
and Dyer and Hatch (2006), among others, have pointed to the importance of studying 
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situations where competing core firms share the same network of suppliers in order to 
explain how different governance leads to different performance results. 
TABLE 1 
Sample of Strategic Suppliers in the Italian Motorcycle part industry 
 
 
 
We sampled eighteen Italian motorcycle parts suppliers, basing our selection on: (1) 
Highest market share within the industry (according to official data), (2) Other firms 
and opinion leaders’ suggestions, and (3) Previous studies (Lipparini and Lorenzoni, 
2005; Lipparini, Lorenzoni, Ferriani and Aversa, 2009; Lipparini et al., 2001). Table 1 
provides the principal characteristics of the firms in our sample.  
Supplier Product/Service Establishment Multimarket
Nr. of 
connections
First round of 
interviews (h)
Second round of 
interviews (h)
Total interviews 
(h)
S1
Design and 
engineering 2002 Yes 7 4 3 7
S2 Brakes and wheels 1961 Yes 37 4 1 5
S3 Mechanical parts 1963 No 10 3 2 5
S4
Carburators and 
injections 1933 Yes 31 4 3 7
S5
Throttle systems, 
handlebars 1951 No 44 2 2 4
S6 Electronics 1920 Yes 32 3 2 5
S7 Lights 2001 No 35 3 2 5
S8
Design and 
engineering 1979 Yes 25 3 2 5
S9
Brakes, frames 
and wheels 1950 Yes 24 5 2 7
S10 Electronics 1913 Yes 36 5 2 7
S11 Wheels 1988 No 17 5 2 7
S12
Forks and shock 
absorbers 1949 Yes 30 3 2 5
S13 Engines 1951 Yes 7 5 3 8
S14
Forks and shock 
absorbers 1945 No 25 4 3 7
S15 Chains 1919 Yes 24 4 2 6
S16 Silencers 1969 No 17 2 3 5
S17 Lights 1969 No 18 3 2 5
S18 Frames 1934 Yes 24 7 2 9
69 40 109
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All of the firms are first tier suppliers, which means that they have a direct 
connection to the assembly firms, to whom they provide finished or semi-finished parts. 
They manufacture strategic parts of motorcycles (e.g. we consider brakes, frames, 
electronics to be strategic parts, while we define bolts, batteries, and rear mirrors as 
irrelevant) or provide some relevant service for the design and manufacturing of the 
vehicle (i.e. molds production, quality control, design or aerodynamics testing). 
Furthermore, any supplier’s design activity and at least 50% of the manufacturing is 
located in Italy, and the suppliers deal not only with Italian and foreign customers, but 
also with customers of different sizes such as (1) Volume producers, (2) Specialist 
producers and (3) Niche specialists (Muffatto and Panizzolo, 1996). 
 
Data 
We developed a longitudinal analysis that covers a period of 65 years (from the end 
of World War II to the year 2010). We divided this time period into three sub-periods 
that are determined by the principal turning points of the industry.  
t1: Establishment of the first integrated network of suppliers (1950s and 1960s).  
t2: Entry of foreign firms and introduction of electronics (1970s and 1980s).  
t3: Introduction of modern scooters; mergers and acquisitions wave (1990s and 
2000s). For the time period 1945-1960s we mainly found qualitative reports and 
historical documents. However, from the early 1970s onward we retrieved complete 
datasets. Hence, we created a collective database that merged the following sources: (1) 
ANCMA2 Italian longitudinal database of vehicle registrations (1976-2010), (2) 
                                                
2 ANCMA: Italian bicycles motorcycles and accessories manufacturers association. 
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ACEM3 European registrations and in use data (1993-2009), (3) ACI4 Italian vehicle in 
use per type (1995-2009), (4) World data from national associations of vehicles (MIC, 
JAMA, MCIA5), (5) Various data collected from websites, magazines, trade fair 
materials, catalogs. 
Our research aims at developing grounded theory through direct semi-structured 
interviews and structured questionnaires, on-site visits, and documental analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Yin, 2008). Leveraging longitudinal data, we offer a process 
interpretation via theoretical propositions.  
 
Interviews 
We developed two rounds of interviews: a set of in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
(2008-2009) and a survey based on a structured questionnaire (2009-2010). During the 
first round, we visited and interviewed entrepreneurs and top or medium managers who 
were in charge of dealing with external production partners, who often are original parts 
manufacturers (OEM).  For the second round of interviews we collected data for our 
survey (2009-2010). Detailed questionnaires were completed via phone calls to collect 
mangers’ opinions. All of the interviews in both the first and second rounds have been 
transcribed, translated from Italian to English, and coded simultaneously by three 
scholars. The coders discussed the sentences until sharing a common interpretation. To 
avoid over/underestimation biases (Miller, Cardinal and Glick, 1997), we triangulated 
the coding results with document analysis that included administrative documents and 
                                                
3 ACEM: European motorcycles association. 
4 ACI: Italian association for vehicle transportation. 
5 MIC: Motorcycle Industry Council (US). JAMA: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association. 
MICA: Motor Cycle Industry Association (UK). 
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reports, company profiles, catalogues, magazines, newspapers, industry research, 
previous interviews, and websites. Also, we randomly selected some suppliers’ 
responses and asked partnering firms to confirm what the interviewee had stated. Visits 
to the production plants helped us to reach a deeper understanding of technologies, 
innovations, and routines.  
 
Survey, Values, and Scales 
In the second round of interviews, we developed a survey, addressed to either two or 
three top managers (generally involved in R&D, production, and sales departments). 
Each interviewee compiled three questionnaires, one for each of the three distinct 
different phases of the motorcycle industry evolution (t1 1950s-1960s; t2 1970s-1980s; t3 
1990s-2000s). The collected data helped us to develop our three main dimensions – 
strategic focus, asset specificity and firm size – defined as follows: 
Strategic focus. To measure the width of strategic focus in the supply firms we asked 
suppliers’ managers to self-assess their company’s commitment to diverse projects. The 
questionnaire was based on a seven-item Likert scale (Likert, 1932). We calculated 
average values of managers’ responses for each supplier and confirmed them through 
the qualitative information we gathered from the semi-structured interviews and the 
secondary data. Then, we attributed a score between 1 and 7 to every firm at the 
supplier level, where 1 indicates the adoption of a single-goal strategy, and 7 indicates 
an equilibrium between a two strategic diverging objectives (e.g. new product 
development and cost reduction).  
Asset specificity. Williamson defines asset specificity as durable investments 
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undertaken in support of particular transactions (Williamson, 1985 : 55). According to 
Nishiguchi (1994) asset specificity might involve tangible resources such as plants, 
production lines, machineries, moulds, as well as intangible resources such as human 
resources, patents, inventions, and knowledge sharing routines. One of the motivations 
that lead firms to engage in dedicated investments is, among others, the acquisition of 
new knowledge and capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 1998). As scholarship from 
transaction costs economics has underlined, asset specificity breeds trusts and helps to 
avoid opportunism between partners (Williamson, 1975, 1979). In this work, we 
consider asset specificity as transaction-specific R&D investments that aim at 
enhancing the relational quality with some selected OEMs. Former studies have 
demonstrated how relation-specific skills developed between suppliers and their 
automakers generated surplus profits and competitive advantages for collaborating firms 
(Asanuma, 1989b; Dyer, 1996a). Since asset-specific investments are not specified in 
balance sheets, we asked managers to assess their value on a 1-10 scale. We calculated 
the average value of managers’ response and transformed them in a synthetic index 
(scale 1-10).  
Firm Size. We monitored changes in firm size through sales. Although competing in 
the same industry (i.e. motorcycle components) firm sales in our sample are not directly 
comparable, due to the suppliers’ different nature. For example, comparing sale results 
of a brake manufacturer with the sales of a company offering services in aerodynamic 
shield design would be clearly misleading. Accordingly, we benchmarked each sales 
value with at least three other firms (in the industry worldwide) competing in the same 
product business. We collected data at t1, t2, and t3. Then, we compared each firm sales 
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to the sale results of at least three other firms (in the industry worldwide). We calculated 
the average value in terms of sales in the time range. When the firm performs lower 
than 30% of the average value in the product business, we define it as “small”; when it 
performs over 30% of the average value we define the firm as “big”; otherwise we 
define it as “medium”.  
Figure 1 represents the basic matrix that emerged from our dimensions. The Y-axis 
reports strategic focus values; the X-axis shows asset specificity values. The three 
progressive bubbles explain the suppliers’ change in size from “small” over “medium” 
to “big”. When suppliers have less than 3.5 as their strategic focus value, it means that 
they are focused on a single activity. When a supplier has fewer than a strategic focus of 
3.5, is focuses on efficiency, we have represented with a white bubble, while when a 
supplier has fewer than a strategic focus of 3.5, is focuses on knowledge, we have 
represented with a grey bubble. With a value of strategic focus over 3.5, suppliers are 
considered ambidextrous (black bubbles). With this data we have built a set of matrices, 
which represents iterative tabulations  to compare the intensity of the peripheries’ 
strategies with the multiple case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989 : 541).  
 
SHORT HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN MOTORCYCLE INDUSTRY 
As several studies have pointed out, the motorcycle industry is an interesting 
research field for observing intriguing competitive dynamics and consequently for 
developing theories (Lipparini and Lorenzoni, 2005; Lipparini et al., 2001; Mintzberg et 
al., 1996; Muffatto and Panizzolo, 1996; Pascale, 1996; Wezel, 2005). In this work we 
define diverse types of vehicles as follows: A motorcycle is a motor vehicle of any 
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engine capacity, excluding cars or commercial vehicles. A motorbike is a two-wheeled 
vehicle with relatively big wheels, multiple-gear engine, which requires a riding 
position of the driver. A scooter is a two-wheeled vehicle with relatively small wheels, 
a single-gear engine, and front shield, which permits a seated position of the driver. A 
moped is a low-powered motorbike, with maximum 125cc engine, relatively light 
chassis, no front shield or extended plastic fairings, which allows for a seated position 
of the driver. 
The Italian motorcycle industry has one of the oldest traditions in motorcycle 
manufacturing and it is one of the most dynamic markets worldwide, representing a 
challenging environment for OEMs. Over the last 50 years, some Italian producers 
“disappeared” (e.g. Italjet). Some restarted after long inactivity, sometimes after being 
acquired by groups (e.g. Moto Guzzi, MV Agusta), and others redefined their product 
portfolio (e.g. Laverda, Benelli). Some local brands continuously competed in the 
market (e.g. Piaggio, Aprilia, Ducati, Malaguti), although they struggled to challenge 
foreign manufacturers, who enlarged their presence in Italy by establishing new plants 
and R&D centers (e.g. Honda), acquiring local firms (e.g. Harley Davidson over MV 
Agusta, sold again to the previous owners in August 2010), importing products (e.g. 
Triumph) or heavily relying on the local supply network (e.g. KTM, BMW). Over the 
years, local firms developed a wide spectrum of hardly-replicable capabilities and 
assets. The growth of a technology-specific industry – especially after World War II – 
favored the establishment of a network of specialized firms to supply motorcycle 
manufacturers. Most of them started as independent workshops, leveraging technical 
knowledge that their founders had absorbed working in core firms. Especially after the 
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1950s, the progress of technology and the increasing complexity of production led 
manufacturers to rely on the expertise of local suppliers. As a result, motorbike and 
scooter producers turned into knowledge integrators (Brusoni et al., 2001; Grant, 1996a; 
Pisano, 1994), turning diverse technological parts into a comprehensive architectural 
design (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Whereas big assemblers have developed internally 
some of the core capabilities and manufacturing processes (engines, power-train, and 
aerodynamics) in recent years, the smaller ones have tended to outsource also strategic 
activities to specialized suppliers. As a result, peripheral firms manufacture the majority 
of the components and foster innovation, while core firms coordinate in-house and 
outsourced design activities (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Clark, 1989). The presence of a 
technologically advanced supply network remains a distinctive feature of the Italian 
motorcycle industry. Our interviews show how the highly developed network of 
suppliers constitutes a strong point for the local assemblers and represents one of the 
biggest attractors for foreign investment. The fact that most of the global motorcycle 
manufacturers sought commercial partnerships with a limited number of parts producers 
led to an overlap of collaborations between OEMs and suppliers. Similar to what has 
happened in the Japanese automobile industry (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Takeishi, 2001), 
motorcycle producers in the Italian industry benefit from cooperative relations with 
suppliers that also work for their competitors. To avoid opportunism, local firms 
develop specific alliance capabilities (Lipparini et al., 2001), thus fostering trust 
through intense interactions. Hence, it is crucial to consider relational activities to 
understand the role of the strategic peripheries, especially because the suppliers’ 
innovation capability is developed through the interaction with core firms. Prior studies 
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have shown how competence-destroying technological changes often modify the 
competitive forces that rule the industry and challenge the survival probability of the 
firms. Scholars have demonstrated that, for example, in the typesetter industry (Tripsas, 
1997), the photolithographic alignment system industry (Henderson and Clark, 1990), 
and the aircraft engine control system industry (Brusoni et al., 2001) technological 
trajectories underwent radical shifts following the path of a punctuated equilibrium – 
which develops through radical innovations (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). Along 
these lines, we divide the historical development of the motorcycle industry into three 
consecutive periods that are related to revolutionary changes in technological standards 
(Kuhn, 1970). Radical innovations (1) affected the structure of the market, (2) nurtured 
introduction of new modular products and (3) forced firms to redefine their competitive 
behavior through evolving sets of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997).  
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THE EVOLUTION OF PERIPHERAL FIRMS 
THROUGH A NOVEL TYPOLOGY 
Our study analyzes the development of the Italian motorcycle industry over a period 
of 65 years, which we divide into three phases marked by technological turning points. 
For each of these phases, we have measured values of asset specificity, strategic focus, 
and firm size for every competing supplier. These measures observe the quality of 
suppliers’ relational capabilities. We have developed a set of theoretical propositions 
aimed at understanding the peripheries’ role, competitive behavior, and capabilities. The 
results on our assessments at t1, t2 and t3 are reported in table 2.  
TABLE 2 
Values of Asset Specificity, Strategic Focus and Firm Size at t1, t2 and t3 
 
 
Supplier
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
S16
S17
S18
t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3
n.a.* n.a.* 2 n.a.* n.a.* 1 n.a.* n.a.* 1
2 6 8 2 4 6 1 2 3
4 6 9 1 1 2 1 1 2
3 4 6 4 4 5 2 2 3
2 2 2 1 2 4 1 1 2
4 6 9 4 5 5 2 3 3
n.a.* n.a.* 6 n.a.* n.a.* 2 n.a.* n.a.* 2
n.a.* 8 4 n.a.* 1 1 n.a.* 1 1
1 3 4 3 5 5 2 3 3
5 8 9 5 6 7 3 3 3
n.a.* 1 3 n.a.* 2 4 n.a.* 1 2
6 7 6 2 2 1 2 2 2
3 3 8 2 3 3 1 2 3
2 2 2 3 4 3 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
n.a.* 3 3 n.a.* 1 3 n.a.* 1 2
n.a.* 7 7 n.a.* 2 2 n.a.* 1 2
2 7 9 2 3 4 2 2 3
*n.a. = non active at tn
Asset Specificity Strategic Focus Firm Size
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t1 - Establishment of the First Network of Suppliers (1950s and 1960s) 
FIGURE 2  
t1 - Establishment of the First Network of Suppliers (1950s and 1960s) 
Our first examination of the Italian motorcycle industry covers the 1950s and 1960s. 
We also considered, when available, relevant insights from the end of World War II 
(1945). We decided to omit from the analysis of t1 all those companies that began their 
activity in 1969 (i.e. S16 and S17) as the data was only related to the first year of start-
up activity.  
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After World War II, the majority of Italian population faced a great need for mobility 
despite the generally low spending capacity. Two-wheel vehicles and cheap low-
powered cars – such as the Fiat 500 – constituted an affordable option. In the 
motorcycle industry, a network of suppliers emerged to support motorcycle OEMs (e.g. 
Ducati, Piaggio, Guzzi). Low-capacity motorbikes (up to 250cc) with light frames, 50cc 
mopeds, and some basic scooters, like the legendary “Vespa” by Piaggio, became 
especially popular. Suppliers started mainly as independent workshops, where some 
skilled mechanics, often helped by a small number of co-workers, developed the first 
serial part productions. Most suppliers focused their capabilities on manufacturing 
single components or partial assemblies (e.g. S10). In other cases – just like it happened 
for S2 and S12 – the entrepreneur had previously worked for an automotive firm. 
Spinning off the core firm, they exported skills and capabilities into their new 
entrepreneurial firms. The brain drain from the motorcycle companies and the 
consecutive development of specialized technical skills around single parts started a 
migration of capabilities that shifted the locus of innovation (Pisano, 1994; Powell et 
al., 1996) from the core to the periphery of the network. 
Figure 2 shows the situation of suppliers at t1. All of the firms are small or mediu- 
sized, with the exception of S10. The common small size is due to (1) Young age of 
suppliers (especially in the niche area), (2) Common undercapitalization of Italian firms 
(especially in the post-war period) and (3) Relatively low market demand. In addition, 
OEMs developed most of the components in-house. The supply network played a minor 
role because the simple product architecture still allowed core firms to design almost the 
entire vehicle with little effort. Overall, the motorcycle market was not competitive yet. 
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This situation was due to the long average product life cycle (over 5 years), the limited 
number of big local competitors (European producers were few, Japanese and Asian 
competitors completely absent), the longer time-to-market for vehicle product design 
(about four years), and the low technological complexity (pure mechanics and no 
electronics). Since the importance of peripheries is higher when the competition 
between cores is intense, suppliers played a minor role in this period. 
Figure 2 shows a concentration of firms in the area of niche suppliers. Suppliers with 
a low level of strategic focus (< 3.5) concentrate either on efficiency-based (white 
bubbles) or knowledge-based activities (grey bubbles). Firms specialized in cost cutting 
(S3, S5, S14, S15, S18) are more numerous than the ones concentrating on 
technological activities (S9, S2, S13). Two reasons justify this. First, it is easier to 
develop efficiency skills when there is no previous tradition of knowledge activities. 
Cycles of continuous innovations, R&D centers, and dedicated knowledge workers are 
strategic assets that require an extensive use of resources and the establishment of 
routines. While knowledge resources (e.g. patents, design sheets, prototypes, 
machineries) can be easily transferred or acquired, the recombination of assets through 
capabilities represents an idiosyncratic process that is often embedded in organizational 
routines and tacit knowledge (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Second, low investments in 
asset specificity correlates with less intense interactions between suppliers and 
assemblers. Since literature posits that inter-firm relations are a source of competitive 
advantage (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999) and that the firms with a higher relational 
capability are able to outperform competitors in fostering innovations (Owen-Smith and 
Powell, 2004; Powell and Brantley, 1992; Whittington, Owen-Smith and Powell, 2009), 
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firms that do not invest in building relations are more likely to adopt strategies based on 
cost cutting and manufacturing optimization. Although efficiency is less relevant during 
the start-up period, in the early years of standard activity, suppliers’ are concerned about 
efficiency when no prior relational assets are available. This leads us to the first 
theoretical proposition: 
Proposition 1. Ceteris paribus, suppliers are likely to focus on efficiency-based 
strategies in the first phase of business, when they cannot leverage former 
stratifications of relational resources and capabilities. 
Despite the prevalence of efficiency-based firms, three of the niche suppliers are 
mainly dedicated to knowledge-based activities (S2, S9, S13). While S2 and S13 
manufacture brake systems, S13 is a traditional designer and manufacturer of engines. 
In the architecture of two-wheel vehicles, brakes and engines are among the most 
important parts, because they are often customized on the assemblers’ requirements and 
are distinctive vehicle features. Also, the structure of these parts usually affects other 
parts’ design. For example, frames are commonly designed after defining engine size 
and volume, and not vice versa. Hence, suppliers who manufacture critical components 
have more influence on the finished product design and performance. Due to this 
structural relationship, assemblers consider these suppliers critical. Because vehicle 
design is adapted to critical parts design, critical suppliers are able to explore 
technological solutions and suggest more innovations. This is why we affirm that 
critical suppliers have a higher potential for experimentation and, therefore, innovation. 
Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus, critical suppliers have higher potential for 
experimentation and, therefore, innovation. 
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S4, S6 and S10 are larger than the other firms due to a longer presence in the market, 
which allowed them to improve their commercial network, maximize production, and 
enlarge strategic focus. Since efficiency is connected to large production scales and 
innovation is usually fostered by investment in asset specificity, firms must engage 
more managerial and economic resources to sustain growth. Consequently, the 
widening of strategic focus at the peripheral level correlates to firm size growth. The 
supplier S12 is the only one that at t1 is in the area of committed suppliers. The two 
entrepreneurs acquired their skills during a previous work experience at Ducati. They 
collaborated with their former employer as soon as they established their company. The 
opportunity to derive a positive set of collaborations from spin-off activities, based on 
shared experience, acted as a trigger for a capability in alliance management and 
knowledge absorption (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). The emerging corporate coherence 
(Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter, 1994) between the supplier and the assembler 
determined an increase in relational skill. Quotes from our interviews confirm this 
claim: 
“We have developed the best collaborations when two aspects were present. First we 
have to trust the other part. Trust is not merely related to contracts; common values, 
common ideas, and most of all common knowledge are fundamental. We must somehow 
talk the same technical language, share the same code, and have a similar vision for 
our goals. If the communication doesn’t work, the understanding doesn’t work, and 
consequently the output can be inferior to our expectations. Second, we tend to build 
special relations with customers that have worked with us for a long time. […] For 
some customers, like BMW or Ducati, we have built dedicated production lines, trial 
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centers, and we trained human resources that work exclusively for them”. (S12 
Technical Director) 
This inherent relational capability is represented by the S12’s proactive commitment 
for asset-specific investments. According to prior studies (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; 
Szulanski, 1996), characteristics of the learning relationship affect the firms’ 
performance. However, while relational view scholars have stressed that sharing 
competences in an alliance improves the core firm’s performance (Lorenzoni and 
Lipparini, 1999), the peripheral view turns the perspective upside down confirming that 
it positively influences the supplier’s relational capabilities as well. Since scholars have 
demonstrated that superior inter-firm relational capabilities lead to higher performance, 
we can affirm that:  
Proposition 3. Ceteris paribus, sharing common competences between supplier and 
assembler positively affects the supplier’s relational capabilities and, therefore, 
performance. 
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t2: Entry of foreign firms and introduction of electronics (1970s and 1980s)  
FIGURE 3 
t2 - Entry of foreign firms and introduction of electronics (1970s and 1980s) 
The second key period of our analysis focuses on the two decades from the 
beginning of the 1970s to the end of the 1980s, in which two major phenomena changed 
the competition within the industry. The first is the arrival of foreign motorcycle 
producers. From the beginning of the 1970s, big international manufacturers (from 
Japan, Europe and the United States) started to recognize the Italian market’s potential. 
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The increasing presence of international assemblers accelerated the already fierce 
internal competition. The majority of foreign firms simply started to export their 
vehicles to the Italian market. However, they soon realized that they needed stronger 
assets to brave the relentless rivalry with local manufacturers. Hence, the commercial 
structures turned first into strategic supply points and later into R&D centers. Some 
firms (e.g. Honda, Yamaha) established manufacturing plants and developed their own 
supply networks. For example, in 2010 Honda supply network (CISI) involved 18 
suppliers and about 920 employees, with a turnover of around $180 billions per year 
(according to official Honda reports). The OEMs knew that the innovative capabilities 
embedded in the local Italian industry were a profitable opportunity to foster their 
competitiveness in Europe as OEM managers’ quotes show: 
“Of course, the most important reason why Honda decided to come to Italy was 
related to the relevance of market sales. But the decision to convert a commercial 
structure into a production plant and an R&D center was motivated by the fact that we 
wanted to create motorbikes in a place where we could benefit from the positive effects 
of a strong tradition and passion for two-wheel vehicles. (…) The possibility of 
accessing specific know-how about components also influenced our decision. There are 
other places in the world where motorcycles have a long history and are widely used. 
But a concentration of competence, like the one we have found in Italy, is almost 
unique”. (Honda Italy, Communication Manager) 
Newcomers – such as Honda, Yamaha, BMW, and Harley-Davidson – increased the 
level of competition between core firms, but at the same time fed the local suppliers 
with higher production volumes and new technological challenges. For example, while 
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the US and European producers benefitted from the local competence in heavyweight 
motorbike design, the Japanese fostered the development of lightweight vehicles, the 
use of plastics, and the adoption of electronic systems. The latter aspect caused the 
second most relevant change at the peripheral level. Until the late 1960s, the electrical 
components in two-wheel vehicles were limited to basic devices such as batteries, 
ignition systems, spark plugs, and head and tail lights. Instead, from the early 1970s 
onward, core firms and peripheries started to develop the first electronic control units 
(ECU) used to drive and control the electrical systems together with the other 
subsystems in a motor vehicle. The introduction of ECUs was a radical innovation since 
it redefined the design of the second-generation engines (the injection systems almost 
totally substituted the carburetors by the late 1980s) and, becoming a new technological 
standard, it progressively involved all the players in the supply network. As a 
consequence, the entire vehicle architecture underwent structural changes and 
peripheral firms had to cooperate with assemblers to realize them. Similar to what 
Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt recorded regarding loosely coupled networks of suppliers 
in control systems for aircraft engines (2001), core firms combined suppliers’ modular 
knowledge. The diffusion of technical knowledge through the network empowered the 
suppliers, who introduced the highest number of innovations at the sub-components 
level in those years. To exploit this abundance of innovation, all of the motorcycle 
manufacturers doubled the number of product versions in their portfolios.  
Figure 3 depicts supplier positioning in these two decades. Comparing the matrix in 
t2 with t1, data shows that four new firms have enriched the strategic network of 
peripheries: S8 (design and engineering, est. 1979); S11 (wheels, est. 1988); S16 
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(silencers, est. 1969); S17 (lights, est. 1969). The emergence of suppliers involved in 
critical activities (design and engineering) is due to the increasing product complexity 
that pushed OEMs to outsource their strategic activities. Also, it demonstrates that the 
locus of innovation has shifted from the core to the industry’s periphery (Lipparini et 
al., 2009; Lipparini et al., 2001), both for single components and architectural design. 
Quotes from our interviews highlight that the 1973 oil crisis focused people’s attention 
on fuel consumption, which highly influenced motorcycle manufacturing. To increase 
efficiency, OEMs started a progressive optimization of ECUs and aerodynamics. 
Designing the shape of motorcycles was no longer a mere matter of styling and 
aesthetics, but a technical process that implied new engineering capabilities and 
dedicated investments to tools and machinery (e.g. wind tunnels). Also, to reduce 
vehicles’ weight, firms increasingly used plastics instead of metals. At that time, most 
motorcycle manufacturers believed that leveraging the market to access these 
capabilities was the best option. The fact that OEMs rely on specialized suppliers 
refutes the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1985), which affirmed that 
firms tend to internalize complex activities in order to attain more control in crucial 
processes. However, evidence in our field has shown that the development of strong 
ties, built through suppliers’ relational capabilities, counterbalanced OEM’s need for 
control. The overall picture we have provided leads us to the fifth proposition: 
Proposition 4. Ceteris paribus, suppliers’ specialization and relational capabilities 
positively affect assemblers’ tendency to outsource complex critical processes. 
The second phenomenon comparing the typologies at t1 and t2 is a more 
homogeneous spread of suppliers along the different strategic areas. From an initial 
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dense presence of niche suppliers (t1), we have recorded at t2 a more balanced presence 
among the four quadrants. The matrix shows six niche suppliers, three committed 
suppliers, three flexible suppliers, and three multi-purpose suppliers. Over the first 
twenty years, industry sales flourished and the stabilization of the core firms helped 
suppliers to analogously stabilize their presence as well as their cash flow. The firm 
failure rate in the industry almost reached zero. Indeed, none of the firms in our sample 
ceased their activities and or decreased in size – five of them actually grew. The 
suppliers’ excess of resources due to positive environmental conditions have partially 
been used for strategic activities, which first increased the awareness of their own 
competitive positioning and then helped the firms to reach a more consistent market 
position. Peripheries sought their own niche in free interstices of competitive spaces – 
that are managers’ “mental maps” defining who is seen as a competitor (D'aveni, 
Gunther and Cole, 2001 : 10), which increased heterogeneity among peripheral firms. 
As D’Aveni and Gunther have found, by moving into each competitive area and acting 
to create a new advantage or to undermine a competitor’s new advantage, the firm 
seizes the initiative. This contributes not only to a better definition of their own 
position, but also to throw the competitor temporarily off-balance (D'Aveni and 
Gunther, 1994 : 250). This homoeostatic adaptation within competitive spaces, the 
positive economic situation and the growth of the market demand due to new entrants at 
the assembly level created the most favorable environment ever for Italian suppliers. 
The technological innovation rate at the component level increased and inter-firm 
cooperation became a standard requirement for each part of the network. Firms involved 
in the manufacturing of critical components – such as electronics or engines – had to 
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rely on intense interactions to integrate ECUs into the engine system.  
“Our people started to cooperate with other suppliers when a big motorcycle 
manufacturer required us to integrate our mechanical skills with the ECU unit provided 
by [supplier’s name omitted – S10]. Before that moment we used to work only with our 
customers. We started to meet the [S10]’s technicians at the customer’s plant. Then, 
when the meetings became more frequent, we felt the need to be independent. So we 
started to invite the people of [S10] to our labs, where we equipped a specific testing 
area for our shared projects.” (S13 Technical Director) 
Although the general peripheries’ growth due to excess of resources is in line with 
Penrose’s results (1959), it did not foster the expected diversification. Suppliers 
leveraged their profits to stress specialization by increasing their investments in 
technology and in asset specificity, which aimed at reinforcing relationships with 
OEMs. We summarize these specific peripheral firms’ characteristics as follows 
Proposition 5. Ceteris Paribus, positive market conditions and excess of internal 
resources foster specialization and relational investments at the supplier level. 
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t3: Introduction of Modern Scooters; Mergers and Acquisitions Wave (1990s and 
2000s) 
FIGURE 4 
t3: Introduction of Modern Scooters;  
Mergers and Acquisitions Wave (1990s and 2000s) 
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for two-wheel vehicles. The first “Vespa” (invented in 1946) had a light frame, a 
manual-geared low-power engine – usually no larger than 120cc –, and a chassis with 
metal front shield. During the late 1980s, OEMs started to design a new generation of 
scooters, trying to build a vehicle that was easy to drive and to repair and cheap to 
manufacture. Low consumption was also a major concern. Consequently, the new 
scooter maintained small capacity engines, small wheels, and front shields, while the 
chassis was mainly made of plastics and the gear system changed from manual to 
automatic. At the same time, core firms kept relying heavily on external partners to 
develop shields that provided efficient aerodynamic cover and appealing design. The 
start of the new scooter segment increased sales of vehicles and components. Since 
scooters are marketed as “cheap” vehicles, the suppliers consequently have to push for 
bigger sale volumes and higher efficiency to satisfy core firms’ requests. Hence, all 
suppliers in our sample grew in size (the matrix presents seven big and nine medium 
peripheries), and almost all of those with narrow strategic focus engaged mostly in 
efficiency-based activities (eight suppliers out of ten). S1 and S8 are the only two 
suppliers with narrow strategic focus that remained small and continued pure 
knowledge-based activities, such as top-quality design or costumized engineering for 
core firm projects. To improve vehicle efficiency, motorcycle producers supported 
technological development of the ECU, which culminated with the adoption of the 
electronic fuel injection (EFI) in the early 1990s. The EFI further increased the 
complexity of the vehicles’ design, and required an additional intensification of 
cooperation between cores and peripheries as well as between different suppliers. In the 
late 1990s, scooters became not only an urban means to avoid traffic congestion on 
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short distances, but they also turned into all-purpose vehicles. To guarantee sufficient 
power train for highways and longer journeys, OEMs started to increase the engine 
capacity, which progressively moved from the traditional 50cc up to 750cc. Chassis 
became stronger and plastics were tested to travel at higher speed. Overall, scooters 
became increasingly similar to the motorbike concept, until they even adopted some 
typical motorbike sub-systems such as brakes, catalytic converters, and high 
performance shock absorbers. Moreover, Italian suppliers’ innovation capabilities 
supported assemblers in groundbreaking projects. For example Bertone, a design and 
engineering supplier based in Turin, coordinated the BMW’s C1 project, which 
developed the first enclosed scooter that pioneered in featuring some of the traditional 
car accessories such as anti-lock brakes (ABS), intelligent audio system (volume linked 
to speed), interior reading light, heated grips and sun roof. Zander and Kogut previously 
affirmed that “the ability to improve a product […] rests on the recombination of 
already learned skills” (Zander and Kogut, 1995). Along these lines, the interaction 
among professional networks, which leveraged their shared relational capabilities to 
transfer new technical skills, attained new technologies and products. In the Italian 
industry, the physical proximity of the main participants, the stratification of common 
knowledge and the embeddedness in a professional community that operates as a 
community of practice – defined as “groups of people informally bound together by 
shared expertise and passion for a joint enterprise” (Wenger and Snyder, 2000 : 139) – 
fostered product innovation through the recombination of internal capabilities and 
shared knowledge. However, while former studies described the positive effects of 
recombination and relational capabilities on core firms’ rents (Dyer, 1996a; Dyer, 
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1996b), we can affirm that they positively affect supplier firms as well.  These empirical 
and theoretical arguments support our seventh proposition. 
Proposition 6. Ceteris paribus, the embeddedness of suppliers in communities of 
practice fosters both supplier and assemblers’ innovation, through the recombination of 
suppliers’ internal capabilities and shared knowledge. 
A wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) also characterized period t3. Peripheral 
firms pursued rapid growth via M&As for several reasons. First, to grow in size and, 
therefore, access more resources to satisfy market demand. Second, to improve 
efficiency through higher production scale. Third, to attain complementary resources 
and capabilities. Since suppliers needed to increase efficiency, partnerships, acquisition 
and joint ventures aimed at reducing manufacturing costs. For example, partnership 
firms could develop production plants in emerging countries, enhancing capabilities, 
and decrease default risk. For example, S2 acquired 70% of S11’s shares in 2000, 
raising their shares to 100% in 2002. Honda acquired S3 in 1988, enhancing the asset 
specificity investment, which explains the shift from 6 (t2) to 9 (t3) in the x-axis. Also 
Tenneco, a U.S. multinational group acquired S12 in 2008, providing capital and new 
shared expertise. The output of these activities is reflected in a general increase in size 
depicted in the matrix. In light of the foregoing evidence, we suggest the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 7. Ceteris paribus, assemblers’ focus on efficiency-based strategies and 
high-scale production positively influence suppliers’ tendency to engage in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
The last relevant phenomenon at t3 is related to multi-purpose suppliers that followed 
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a common growth trend over the years. All of the multi-purpose suppliers grew through 
diversification in different but complementary industries. Also, all of them started to 
supply the automobile industry, which is the closest alternative for firms in motorcycle 
manufacturing. Interviews confirmed that corporate diversification enhances the 
diffusion of best practices throughout the organization, and promotes the enhancement 
of complementary capabilities aimed at fostering innovation.  
FIGURE 5 
Overlap of periods t1 t2 t3  
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“We started supplying BMW with motorcycles parts. When BMW asked us to develop 
some projects for their cars (…) we started to systematically codify all our processes, 
and we intensified our patenting activity. Also, when we first started the production, we 
placed the car production lines and the motorcycle ones in different sheds. Then BMW 
suggested to reposition the lines by customer, and not by industry. We tried it and 
noticed how people of the two lines started to help each other to solve little problems 
(like interruptions) on the production flow. Their competencies were somehow 
complementary and the experiment worked, so we decided to keep it that way”.  (S4 
Production Director) 
In figure 5 we have compared the results that emerged from the three different time 
periods to identify some potential trends. The comparison displays suppliers’ tendency 
to move to multi-purpose positioning following two main directions. They either first 
increase strategic focus followed by an increase in asset specificity, or vice versa. 
Building on prior research, we have affirmed that strategic focus is a proxy for 
operational flexibility, while asset specificity is a proxy for relational capabilities. 
Accordingly, evidence shows that suppliers cannot develop these two capabilities at the 
same time. Results are consistent with previous research affirming that small 
organizations usually struggle to develop high levels of ambidexterity at the same time 
(Gupta, Smith and Shalley, 2006). Accordingly to Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004 : 3), 
suppliers rely on a “myopic strategy” such as temporal differentiation, which means a 
focus on a single goal, while allowing this goal to vary over time. Hence, peripheries 
focus on one objective and add another one when the first one is achieved. Evidence 
leads us to the final proposition: 
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Proposition 8. Ceteris paribus, suppliers develop relational and operational 
capabilities sequentially, relying on temporal differentiation strategies. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
Our paper contributes to the “peripheral view of the network”, a theoretical 
perspective fostering a specific analysis of suppliers in manufacturing systems. Among 
several studies that examine the “relational view” (Dyer and Singh, 1998), only few 
papers have dedicated specific attention to suppliers - or “peripheral firms” – and their 
contribution to buyer/assembler’s competitive advantage. Difficulties in retrieving 
extensive data about suppliers, which are often small and privately owned companies, 
possibly discouraged scholars from investigating these actors. Yet, these supply firms 
are nonetheless the new innovation loci for several industries (Gatignon et al., 2002; 
Powell et al., 1996). Hence, a significant question has remained unanswered: what 
drives peripheral firms’ competitive advantage? Through an extensive review of the 
literature concerning the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998), we have proposed a 
novel typology that contributes to the understanding of strategic suppliers. Assessing 
strategic focus as a proxy for operational ambidexterity and asset specificity as proxy 
for relational capabilities, we built a four-quadrants matrix. According to former 
research (Tripsas, 1997), we established three turning points over a time period of 65 
years (1945-2010) to analyze the evolution of eighteen suppliers in the Italian 
motorcycle part industry. For each of these phases, we highlighted radical internal and 
external changes, which shook up the market environment and redefined the strategic 
behavior of both core and peripheral firms. Tracking the changes in the supply network, 
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we tried to build a process theory, which led to eight theoretical propositions. We have 
explained part of the interplay between strategic positioning of suppliers and their 
performance in terms of innovation, sales, and alliance capabilities. The level of 
competition between the assemblers affects the strategic relevance of suppliers, which 
usually engage efficiency-based strategies in their first life phase, when they cannot 
leverage on former relational capabilities (proposition 1). Suppliers with narrow 
strategic focus concentrate on efficiency-based or knowledge-based strategies. The 
importance of a supplier is related to the kind of component it manufactures. In the case 
that components have great influence in defining the finished product architecture, 
suppliers working on these critical components have fewer technological constraints 
and are able to experiment more. Therefore, critical suppliers have higher potential 
innovation (proposition 2). As literature points out, sharing the same type of knowledge 
increases performance (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Relational view scholars 
demonstrated that an overlap of competences between supplier and assemblers increase 
core firms’ competitive advantage. But does this work for suppliers as well? Evidence 
showed that this overlap positively affects suppliers’ performance as well (proposition 
3). As product complexity increases, assemblers outsource critical activities when 
suppliers present advanced specialization and relational capabilities (proposition 4). 
Outsourcing corresponds to a shift in the locus of innovation, since core firms, in order 
to delegate some of the design process, disclose their component-specific knowledge. 
Positive market conditions at the assembly level increase the suppliers’ resources that 
allow peripheries to engage in differentiation strategies, which enhance their 
heterogeneity (proposition 5). Dense and intense relations nurture communities of 
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practice (Wenger and Snyder, 2000), which furthers the recombination of suppliers’ 
internal capabilities and shared knowledge, thereby increasing cores and peripheries’ 
innovation (proposition 6). We noticed that transformations at the assembly level 
produce strategic adaptations at the peripheral level. For example, when the demand at 
the assembly level requires a rapid re-focus on efficiency and high volume production, 
suppliers are likely to undertake M&A to rapidly reach the required critical mass and 
gain access to complementary resources and capabilities (proposition 7). The fit 
between firm size and strategic positioning is still an essential requisite to sustain 
competitive advantage. Diversification in complementary industries favors an increase 
in firm size and suppliers’ adoption of multi-purpose strategies. However, suppliers rely 
on temporal differentiation strategies, which means that they develop one capability at a 
time and invest in another one only once the first capability is achieved (proposition 8). 
In our analysis, we showed that peripheries develop relational capabilities and 
operational ambidexterity at different points in time. 
Concerning managerial implications, we will advance several contributions. Firstly, 
firms require different strategies and tools depending on their position in the supply 
network. Especially in technology based-industries, supply firms are complex ventures, 
which need dedicated managerial capabilities and fine-tuned instruments. Our matrix 
offers a better understanding of suppliers’ competitive position and gauges the fit 
between current strategy and expected performance. Secondly, managers should 
develop multi-level market analyses, as we also proved that environmental changes lie 
beyond competitive spaces. Finally, our work underlines the importance of focusing on 
long-term strategies to identify market trends and respond to cyclical industrial patterns.  
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To foster new research, we underline our work’s limitations and unanswered 
questions. First, we have decided to develop our study on multiple case studies. 
Although this choice is methodologically consistent with process theory building, it 
would be useful to integrate this kind of analysis with more quantitative techniques and 
larger samples. Our classification dimensions are monothetic and based on prior 
literature. Through cluster analysis, it would be possible to develop a polythetic analysis 
that would include other characteristics. Future research should continue to bridge the 
gap between theoretical typology and empirical taxonomy by employing sets of 
operational indicators that directly relate to our theoretical dimensions on a quantitative 
basis. Second, we advanced propositions that might not perfectly fit with divergent 
environments (e.g. the service or creative industry). Future research should develop 
observations across different industrial settings and geographical areas, while possibly 
maintaining a longitudinal approach. Finally, we have mainly focused on relations 
between core firms and peripheral firms. However, the increasing complexity of 
products and technologies has created further levels of suppliers (second tier, third tier, 
and subcontractors). We believe that future research should consider these new actors 
and investigate possible inter-level interactions. Hoping that our study will consequently 
trigger a novel way of addressing this intriguing topic, we leave readers and scholars 
with a last provocative question: “when push comes to shove, how peripheral are 
‘peripheral firms’ really?”  
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WHAT IS BEHIND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY? 
DISPELLING THE OPACITY OF R&D 
 
ABSTRACT 
Strategic management scholarship has identified research and development 
investments as the main proxy to observe absorptive capacity. However, literature 
shows that using exclusively R&D figures fails to unravel the dynamic set of processes 
and routines standing behind firms’ commitment toward knowledge absorption and 
exploitation. This paper unpacks the concept of R&D and presents a four-type typology 
of R&D strategies based on knowledge scope and asset specificity. In a second step, this 
study combines the four-type typology with prior scholarly contributions to advance an 
extension of the absorptive capacity model. Evidence displays significant intra-industry 
differences in R&D strategies, which affect the ways in which firms develop potential 
and realized absorptive capacity. Our results disconfirm previous research, showing 
that regimes of appropriability affect not only the exploitation of knowledge for 
commercial outcomes, but also the decision-making process that firms face before 
engaging in R&D activities. 
 
 
Keywords: Absorptive Capacity; R&D; Typology, Learning Capabilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What is behind absorptive capacity? Starting from the seminal works of Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989, 1990, 1994) scholars have mostly identified research and development 
investments (R&D) as the best proxy to explain variations in firms’ knowledge 
absorption (Meeus, Oerlemans and Hage, 2001; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996; 
Tsai, 2001). Before the appearance of absorptive capacity (AC), economists 
traditionally interpreted R&D as assets aimed at creating knowledge, and consequently 
innovation. For example, while observing technological change, Tilton (1971), Allen 
(1977), and Mowery (1983) affirmed that firms rely on R&D to gather and transform 
knowledge that is available in the environment. Cohen and Levinthal argued that R&D 
commitment not only generates innovations, but also contributes to develop the firm's 
ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit exogenous knowledge – what they called a 
firm's 'learning' or 'absorptive' capacity (1989 : 569). Cohen and Levinthal’s works 
triggered a great proliferation of related research. Following the early contributions, 
some studies have leveraged on synthetic measures (such as R&D intensity) and cross-
sectional analysis (Grimpe and Sofka, 2009; Meeus et al., 2001; Tsai, 2001). However, 
soon scholars started to question the validity of traditional approaches to AC research. 
They argued that since AC was defined as a three-phase process, traditional methods 
were inconsistently static. Consequently, some researchers have started to develop 
process-based capability analysis (Lim, 2009; Zahra and George, 2002). In recent years, 
literature has also consistently shifted toward a relational interpretation of AC, 
adopting, in several cases, dyads or networks as units of analysis (Koza and Lewin, 
1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). The accumulation of works has provided different 
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reflections on determinants and intervening variables affecting AC. Among the 
numerous contributions, recent studies have attempted to synthesize a general 
theoretical model of AC, including what scholars defined as the most relevant advances 
within AC literature (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006; Todorova and Durisin, 2007; 
Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010; Zahra and George, 2002). Although several works 
addressed different theoretical and empirical issues, the traditional operationalization of 
R&D in AC studies has seldom been questioned. Scholarship has directed little 
attention toward the nature of research and development processes and only few 
scholars have recently started to base their research on the microfoundations of 
knowledge absorption capabilities (Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2010). Also, AC has 
been traditionally studied in high-tech industries, neglecting environments where 
technology plays a minor role. However, firms can develop AC in any kind of industry, 
including low-tech sectors or services (Grimpe and Sofka, 2009). In this paper we claim 
that the heterogeneous research around AC must find common ground to foster a 
consistent and comparable set of results. Although scholars mostly agree about 
considering R&D as a reliable proxy to observe AC, the definition of this concept is still 
too general and biased in traditional applications in high-tech industries. We claim that 
R&D should be the touchstone to create a common ground where scholars nurture 
future research. However, the use of R&D as an analytical tool to study AC is still too 
simplified, since synthetic figures cannot depict the complexity of a capability 
generation process and cannot specify intra-industry differences in learning absorption. 
Hence, the concept of R&D must be questioned first and then redefined through general 
terms in order to be applied to any kind of technological environment. Unpacking the 
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building blocks of the well-established R&D concept, we claim that research and 
development is still the most reliable way to observe AC, but its impact on learning 
capabilities is conditioned by the forms it takes. We attempt to identify a typology of 
R&D forms that can be applied both at high, medium-high (HMT), and low, medium-
low (LMT) technology firms. Through a longitudinal process approach, this work tries 
to specify the different natures of R&D, shedding light on the opaque side of learning 
capabilities and updating the general model of AC.  
We unfold this work as follows. In Section 2 we review the main studies that have 
enhanced the understanding of the AC topic and summarize them in a theoretical model 
that includes the most recent advances. We dedicate special attention to 
operationalization of AC, pointing out how scholarship has paid little attention to an 
R&D definition that goes beyond balance sheet figures. In Section 2 we present the 
method, the empirical setting, and the data.  Section 3 reveals the results emerging from 
our data collection and analysis. We develop a typology of R&D forms and apply it to a 
theoretical AC model. The discussion of the main implications, the conclusions, and the 
limitations of this study are in Section 4. 
 
THEORY 
Observing Absorptive Capacity: An Updated Literature Review 
In their 1990 work Cohen and Levinthal defined AC as “the ability of a firm to 
recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 : 128). AC shows how R&D investments 
positively affect learning capabilities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and thus 
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performance and competitive advantage (Lane et al., 2006; Zahra and George, 2002). 
AC helps developing both incremental innovations, which make progress along 
established paths, and disruptive innovations, which redefine technological standards 
(Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). Also, exploiting internal and external knowledge 
through AC helps firms to predict future technological scenarios (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1994). Generally speaking, the ability to identify, absorb, and exploit new knowledge 
depends on prior investments aimed at increasing knowledge assets and learning 
capabilities. Scholars have demonstrated that firms mainly develop external knowledge 
absorption through the accumulation of related knowledge, which improves their skills 
in new knowledge identification, acquisition, and use (Abernathy, 1978; Rosenberg, 
1970; Teece, 1977).  As in a virtuous circle, the more a firm invests in knowledge 
acquisition, the more it learns. The more it learns, the more successfully it acquires new 
knowledge. Since knowledge fosters innovation and hence, performance, it is a source 
of competitive advantage (Grant, 1996a, 1996b). Within the last twenty years, AC 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) has become one of the most cited and diffused concepts in 
management literature, especially when related to the theme of dynamic capabilities 
(Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). To date, the academic web crawler Google Scholar 
reports that the main work on AC “Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning 
and innovation” by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) has been cited more than 12,000 times. 
Three seminal papers by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990, 1994) triggered a great 
proliferation of research on AC. Among several “hot” issues, scholars have struggled to 
define how to observe and measure such an “invisible” capability. After twenty years of 
specific research, scholars are still looking for methods to observe and measure AC. In 
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this fashion, Lim recently affirmed that “the main factor impeding theoretical research 
is that absorptive capacity is frustratingly difficult to observe” (2009 : 1251). Scholars 
have struggled to identify variables that are representative of the firm’s knowledge 
absorption capability, but also synthetic enough to favor the use of clear–cut measures. 
To understand how scholars operationalized AC, we reviewed papers from year 1989 to 
year 2010, published in Strategic Management Journal, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Organization Science, Academy of Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Review, Management Science, Industrial and Corporate Change, 
Research Policy, Management Learning. Although the Economic Journal is not a 
management publication, we included it in our review, since it published the pioneering 
work of Cohen and Levinthal on AC (1989). According to Lane, Koka, and Pathak 
(2006 : 844), we noticed that the variety of contributions can be assigned to two main 
categories. The first one is closer to Cohen and Levinthal’s original approach (1989, 
1990, 1994). Focusing on individual firm’s activity, it mostly favors cross-sectional 
analysis and tends to capture the impact of AC through synthetic measures such as (1) 
R&D intensity (Grimpe and Sofka, 2009; Meeus et al., 2001; Tsai, 2001); (2) patents 
count/citations (Ahuja and Katila, 2001); (3) expertise of the employees (Davies, 1987). 
The second group of studies principally focuses on relational process interpretations, 
mostly considering AC as a dynamic capability (Zahra and George, 2002 : 186). 
Although the majority of this second group of scholars agrees on observing learning 
activities through alliances and networks, works siding for a dynamic interpretation of 
AC present more heterogeneous variables and results than the first group siding for 
synthetic measure and cross-sectional analysis. Among the different determinants of 
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AC, scholars considered (1) knowledge creation objectives (Koza and Lewin, 1998), (2) 
knowledge overlap (Dyer and Singh, 1998); (3) organizational forms, capabilities of 
coordination and combination (Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2005; Van den 
Bosch, Volberda and Boer, 1999); (4) iterative processes of learning (Lane, Salk and 
Lyles, 2001); (5) internal knowledge sharing and integration (Zahra and George, 2002); 
(6) social integration mechanisms and power relations (Easterby-Smith, Graca, 
Antonacopoulou and Ferdinand, 2008; Todorova and Durisin, 2007); (7) internal and 
external R&D processes (Lane et al., 2006; Lewin et al., 2010; Lim, 2009); (8) 
motivation and causal ambiguity (Szulanski, 1996). Only Lane and Lubatkin (1998) 
stuck to a traditional methodology – i.e. R&D as a weighted participation rate for each 
of a firm’s discipline – while framing AC in a dyadic perspective. Table 1 summarizes 
our analysis and lists a selection of the most cited papers we encountered during our 
review. Figure 1 presents an update of the theoretical model presented by Lane et al. 
(2006).  
Among scholars’ studies, the heterogeneity of methods and approaches rarely allows 
for a direct comparison of results. Scholars affirmed that the over-proliferation of works 
seems to increase noise rather than creating common ground to foster deeper 
understanding (Lane et al., 2006). However, literature has shown that researchers do 
agree about some aspects. In fact, the majority of scholars affirmed that R&D 
investments capture, in some way, a firm’s engagement in knowledge absorption 
activities. R&D shows signs of being the consensus on which to foster a consistent 
understanding of AC.  
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Author/s Year Journal Title Approach Method Learning Theoretical background AC antecedents
Cohen and Levinthal 1989 The Economic Journal Innovation and Learning: 
The Two Faces of R & D.
Theoretical Simulation One-way Original R&D intensity*
Cohen and Levinthal 1990 Organization Science Absorptive Capacity: A 
New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation.
Empirical Quantitative One-way Original R&D intensity*
Cohen and Levinthal 1994 Management Science Fortune favours prepared 
firms.
Theoretical Simulation One-way Original R&D intensity*
Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman
1996 Strategic Management 
Journal
Strategic alliances and 
interfirm knowledge 
transfer.
Empirical Quantitative Relational Original R&D intensity*; patents 
citations
Szulanski 1996 Strategic Management 
Journal
Exploring internal 
stickiness: Impediments to 
the transfer of best 
practice within the firm. 
Empirical Quantitative Relational Process Motivation; Causal ambiguity
Lane and Lubatkin 1998 Strategic Management 
Journal
Relative Absorptive 
Capacity and 
Interorganizational 
Learning.
Empirical Quantitative Relational Process R&D intensity (weighted 
participation rate, for each of 
a firm’s discipline)
Koza and Lewin 1998 Organization Science The Co-Evolution of 
Strategic Alliances. 
Theoretical Discussion Relational Process Knowledge creation 
objectives
Dyer and Singh 1998 Academy of 
Management Review
The Relational View: 
Cooperative Strategy and 
Sources of 
Interorganizational 
Competitive Advantage. 
Theoretical Discussion Relational Process Knowledge overlap
Van Den Bosch, 
Volberda, and Boer
1999 Organization Science Coevolution of Firm 
Absorptive Capacity and 
Knowledge Environment: 
Organizational Forms and 
Combinative Capabilities.
Theoretical Discussion One-way Process Organizational form; 
combinative capabilities
Meeus, Oerlemans, and 
Hage
2001 Organization Studies Patterns of interactive 
learning in a high-tech 
region.
Empirical Quantitative One-way Original R&D intensity*
Tsai 2001 Academy of 
Management Journal
Knowledge transfer in 
intraorganizational 
networks: Effects of 
network position and 
absorptive capacity on 
business unit innovation 
and performance. 
Empirical Quantitative Relational Original R&D intensity*
Ahuja and Katila 2001 Strategic Management 
Journal
 Technological 
Acquisitions and the 
Innovation Performance of 
Acquiring Firms: A 
Longitudinal Study.
Empirical Quantitative Relational Original Number of patents; patents 
citations
Lane, Salk, and Lyles 2002 Strategic Management 
Journal
Absorptive Capacity, 
Learnin , and Performance 
in International Joint 
Ventures.
Empirical Quantitative Relational Process Iterative learning in alliances
Zahra and George 2002 Academy of 
Management Review
Absorptive Capacity: A 
Review, 
Reconceptualization, and 
Extension.
Theoretical Discussion Relational Process Internal knowledge sharing 
and integration
Jansen, Van Den Bosch, 
Volberda
2005 Academy of 
Management Journal
Managing potential and 
realized absorptive 
capacity: How do 
organizational antecedents 
matter?
Empirical Quantitative One-way Original Organizational mechanisms; 
coordination
capabilities
Lane, Koka, and Pathak 2006 Academy of 
Management Review
The reification of 
absorptive capacity: a 
critical review and 
rejuvenation of the 
construct.
Theoretical Discussion Relational Process Internal and external R&D 
processes
Todorova and Durisin 2007 Academy of 
Management Review
Absorptive capacity: 
valuing a 
reconceptualization.
Theoretical Discussion One-way Process Social integration 
mechanisms
Easterby-Smith, Graca, 
Antonacopoulou, and 
Ferdinand
2008 Management Learning Absorptive capacity: a 
process perspective.
Empirical Qualitative One-way Process Power relations
Grimpe and Sofka 2009 Research Policy Search patterns and 
absorptive capacity: Low- 
and high-technology 
sectors.
Empirical Quantitative One-way Original R&D intensity; expertise of 
the employees
Lim 2009 Industrial and 
Corporate Change
The many faces of 
absorptive capacity: 
spillovers of copper 
interconnect technology 
for semiconductor chips.
Empirical Qualitative Relational Process Internal and external R&D 
processes
Lewin, Massini, and 
Peters
2010 Organization Science Microfoundations of 
Internal and External 
Absorptive Capacity 
Routines
Theoretical Discussion Relational Process Internal and external R&D 
processes
*R&D intensity= R&D spending/Sales
TABLE 1 
Absorptive Capacity: Review and Operationalization of the Main Determinants 
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FIGURE 1 
 A General Model of Absorptive Capacity, its Antecedents, Outcomes 
and Intervening Variables. 
 
Source: Personal elaboration based on Lane et al., 2006 : 856. 
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R&D: Synthetic figures are not sufficient to describe firms’ different approaches to AC, 
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especially when research is aimed at unfolding the dynamic microfoundations 
underpinning learning capabilities (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). R&D data needs a 
more fine-grained disaggregation in order to understand the nature of learning 
capabilities and allow researchers to apply them to process analysis. Also, R&D 
definition cannot be tailored on HMT only. The definition of R&D must be applicable 
to LMT and service firms as well, since learning is a process that affects any kind of 
organization. Along these lines, Grimpe and Sofka (2009) demonstrated that R&D’s 
search patterns are conditioned on technological intensity of the industry. For example 
HMT firms, such as pharmaceutical and cutting-edge biotech companies need to obtain 
new abstract knowledge before being able to develop innovations. Former research 
supports this point: “Simply put, you cannot do research in either of these two fields 
without a basic knowledge of biochemistry” (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998 : 468). LMT 
firms instead tend to gather information directly from the market to apply it into 
finished products (Grimpe and Sofka, 2009). Along these lines, Lane and Lubatkin 
suggested that R&D may be targeted at creating both general knowledge – which is also 
known as basic or abstract knowledge – and specialized knowledge – which is also 
known as applied or codified knowledge (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Seeking different 
types of knowledge intuitively leads to different outputs and requires different time for 
development. We believe that, to foster consistent coclusions about AC, scholars should 
stick to the few results that have shown consistency across the academic community. 
The general agreement about considering R&D as a critical proxy to observe AC is 
fertile ground for planting new contributions. However, to date the R&D interpretation 
is not developed enough to satisfy the recent interest in process interpretation of 
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dynamic learning capabilities. We suggest to question, unpack, and redefine the R&D 
concept in order to plug it into a general model of AC. This effort will allow for a 
process interpretation of AC and a wider fit of the concept in different kinds of 
industries. Dispelling the opacity of R&D?, this paper attempts to foster new directions 
for future research and greater understanding of firms’ competitive advantage. 
 
METHOD AND DATA 
Sample 
We leveraged data to develop a process theory based on multiple case studies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2008). Our goal was to “identify distinct skills, processes, 
procedures, organizational structures, decision rules, and disciplines, which undergird 
enterprise-level sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring capacities” (Teece, 2007: 1319). By 
focusing on microfoundations of learning routines we tried to anchor our results in the 
original concept of AC, avoiding the common problem of reification (Lane et al., 
2006). Collecting both descriptive statistics and relevant quotations, we advanced a 
typology of R&D investments that works in any type of industry or technology. Also, 
after distinguishing between different forms of R&D, we analyzed how these aspects 
interact within the general model of AC.  
We selected a sample of eighteen parts suppliers in the Italian motorcycle component 
industry (Table 2). We chose this specific setting because (1) it is characterized by 
different types of technologies; (2) it is particularly well-known for its network of 
strategic suppliers; (3) it is an international hypercompetitive setting; (4) it is part of the 
automotive industry, which represents one of the most viable fields for management 
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studies (Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Nishiguchi, 1994; Takeishi, 
2001). Scholars have based earlier studies on the two-wheels vehicle industry 
(Mintzberg, Pascale, Goold and Rumelt, 1996; Pascale, 1996; Wezel, 2005), even 
within the Italian context (Lipparini and Lorenzoni, 2005; Lipparini, Lorenzoni and 
Zollo, 2001; Muffatto and Panizzolo, 1996). The Italian motorcycle industry is the 
biggest European market for use, production, national sales, and exports. In 2009, 
official data revealed that Italy accounted for 55.49% of the total 859.518 vehicles 
manufactured in Europe. Italy is also one of the most innovative areas for motorbike 
and scooter design and manufacturing. Due to this reason, the firms involved in this 
industry range from LMTs (e.g. manufacturers of basic mechanical parts) over HMTs 
(e.g. electronics developers) to service companies (e.g. aerodynamics design and quality 
control).  
These conditions offered us a wide typology of firms within the same industry and 
territory. We based our selection on (1) relevance of market share according to official 
data; (2) reference/signaling from motorcycle companies and components 
manufacturers; (3) analysis of documents and previous studies (Lipparini and 
Lorenzoni, 2005; Lipparini et al., 2001). 
The firms of the sample are first tier suppliers. They manufacture distinctive and 
strategic motorcycle parts (e.g. we consider brakes, frames, electronics to be strategic 
parts, while we define bolts, batteries, and rear mirrors as irrelevant) or provide some 
added-value service in the design and manufacturing of the vehicle (i.e. molds 
production, quality control, design or aerodynamics testing). The entire engineering 
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activity and at least 50% of the manufacturing is located in Italy. These suppliers deal 
with both Italian and foreign customers.  
 
TABLE 2 
Sample of Strategic Suppliers in the Italian Motorcycle Part Industry 
 
Supplier Product/Service
S1 Electronics
S2 Electronics
S3 Chains
S4 Carburators and 
injections
S5 Frames
S6 Forks and shock 
absorbers
S7 Forks and shock 
absorbers
S8 Brakes and wheels
S9 Throttle systems, 
handlebars
S10 Engines
S11 Brakes and wheels
S12 Mechanical parts
S13 Silencers
S14 Lights
S15 Design and Engineering
S16 Silencers
S17 Lights
S18 Design and Engineering
Diversified Customers Average years of 
collaboration
First round of 
interviews (h)
Second round of 
interviews (h)
Total interviews 
(h)
Yes 7 3 3 2 5
Yes 37 21 5 2 7
No 10 21 4 2 6
Yes 31 24 4 3 7
No 44 25 7 2 9
Yes 32 27 3 2 5
No 35 5 4 3 7
Yes 25 12 4 1 5
Yes 24 25 2 2 4
Yes 36 22 5 3 8
No 17 28 5 2 7
Yes 30 16 3 2 5
Yes 7 35 2 3 5
No 25 21 3 2 5
Yes 24 12 4 3 7
No 17 14 5 2 7
No 18 24 3 2 5
Yes 24 12 3 2 5
69 40 109
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Data 
AC is a capability, and thus not directly observable: “Hence, extant theories are often 
based on deductive rather than inductive logic. Even in empirical studies, absorptive 
capacity is often not observed directly, but assumed to increase with coauthoring 
behavior, labor mobility, and R&D investment.” (Lim, 2009 : 1251). Therefore, we 
attempted to gather insights of that kind collecting data through interviews, databases, 
and archives. We developed two rounds of interviews: a set of in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews (2008-2009) and a survey based on a structured questionnaire (2009-2010). 
During the first round, we visited and interviewed entrepreneurs and top or medium 
managers who were in charge of dealing with external production partners, who often 
are original parts manufacturers (OEM). Since AC mostly focuses on external 
knowledge absorption, we targeted managers involved in R&D, manufacturing, 
innovation, product development, and relations with OEMs or technological partners. 
We assessed the survey during the second round of interviews (2009-2010). A 
researcher called the interviewee and filled out a detailed questionnaire during the 
phone call. The managers responded to open questions. All of the interviews in both the 
first and second rounds have been transcribed, translated, and coded simultaneously by 
three scholars. The coders discussed the sentences until sharing a common 
interpretation. To avoid retrospective call biases, we triangulated the coded interviews 
with documental analysis that included administrative documents and reports, company 
profiles, catalogues, magazines, newspapers, industry research, previous interviews, and 
websites. The visits to the production plants helped to reach a deeper understanding of 
technologies and innovations. Finally, to avoid problems of overestimation through 
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retrospective call biases (Miller, Cardinal and Glick, 1997), we randomly selected some 
suppliers’ responses and asked firms that were involved as partners in the learning 
relation to confirm what the interviewee had stated. Our data covers the entire industry 
lifecycle, from the late 1940s until the late 2000s. Our goal was to assess how suppliers 
invested in activities aimed at developing learning capabilities and knowledge assets. 
The longitudinal approach aimed at evaluating the firms’ actions and commitment 
under different circumstances, such as disruptive exogenous changes, which affected 
the market demand and the technological standards. We identified three turning points 
within the history of this industry and at t3 (years 2009 and 2010) we collected data 
concerning each period. We tried to talk with people who were informed about the 
whole firm’s lifecycle. Being mostly family-owned businesses, it was not that difficult 
to find people being able to report information about past activities. However, 
statements have been triangulated through documents and external opinion leaders to 
avoid retrospective biases. The three technological waves in the motorcycle part 
industry are: 
t1: Establishment of the first integrated network of suppliers (1950s and 1960s). 
When the Italian suppliers started their activity, parts manufacturing relied on basic 
mechanical technologies. Hence, component manufacturing was mainly based on 
efficiency. Collaborative innovation through supply relations was uncommon. 
t2: Entry of foreign firms and introduction of electronics (1970s and 1980s). 
Assembly firms started developing complex vehicles. Introduction of electronics 
affected the production of every part supplier. Scooters became popular, pushing 
suppliers to pursue efficiency as well as innovation. The loci of innovation shifted from 
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the core to the periphery of the manufacturing network. Collaborative innovation 
became common between local parts manufacturers and both local and international 
motorcycle OEMs. 
t3: Introduction of modern scooters and mergers and acquisitions wave (1990s and 
2000s). Vehicle innovation rate accelerated and became mainly dependent on suppliers’ 
innovation. Even cheap vehicles (such as scooters) increased complexity, becoming 
more powerful and requiring higher performances. A massive adoption of electronics 
throughout the vehicle forced designers to develop interactions between motorcycle 
sub-parts. Designers focused on ergonomics to increase comfort and aerodynamics. 
Firms started to offer design and quality control services, which brought new types of 
non-manufacturing suppliers into the market. In recent years, suppliers pursued 
dimensional growth via mergers and acquisitions with local and international groups to 
face international crisis and sustain costs of growing competition.  
  
DISPELLING THE OPACITY OF R&D 
Effects of Firms’ Technological Level on R&D Approaches 
We have affirmed that R&D research should capture the different ways in which 
firms engage in R&D projects. According to other scholars, we expect that firms 
develop R&D in various forms, depending on firm specific attributes (Grimpe and 
Sofka, 2009; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Hence, we first tried to establish whether the 
firms in our sample shared a common definition of R&D. According to literature, a 
shared interpretation would help in comparing observed phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1991). 
However, while all interviewees agreed on defining R&D as the investments that their 
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company makes to increase innovation, knowledge, and therefore competitiveness, 
different opinions emerged when we tried to understand in which kind of activities 
firms were involved practically. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) suggested that R&D is 
related to firms’ technological level. Accordingly, we noticed that, even within the same 
industry, firms engage in manufacturing activities requiring different skills. Evidence in 
our sample showed that R&D follows different paths depending on the firm’s 
technological level. Two kinds of approaches emerged from our interviews. HMT firms 
tend to consider R&D as an investment aimed at gathering basic knowledge. Their 
innovation process is usually divided in two steps. Firms first look for knowledge 
belonging to a higher level of science. This kind of knowledge is usually abstract and 
non-codified. Only after securing this knowledge asset, they tend to exploit it to develop 
innovation. As S1 R&D director affirmed: “We have to develop some general 
knowledge before being able to apply it to a new technology. That’s the only way to 
propose something really new to the market.” Another interviewee, the S11 R&D 
director presented a similar situation: “We’ve realized quite soon that to increase the 
quality of our innovations we had to go back to basic science. In our company R&D is a 
lot about physics, for example. We’ve just got a new guy who graduated in physics.” 
Instead, firms competing in a lower technological environment (LMT) tend to apply 
their investments to gathering knowledge for specific products and processes. Their 
goal is to develop a sufficiently innovative outcome, keeping design and production 
efficient. As S12 production manager explained:  
 
 
 
 
 	   114	  
TABLE 3 
Quotations About R&D Investments 
 
“We don't do much R&D…our products are to simple, anyone can make them. But we 
spend a lot of energy thinking about how to cut costs keeping the highest quality 
possible.” S6 production director also stressed how the innovation development is 
aimed at reducing time from the study phase to the practical application: “We try to 
immediately think of new applications. We cannot waste time overanalyzing theories. 
Supplier Product/Service Interviewee Technological Level R&D Focus Quotations
S1 Electronics R&D Director HMT Abstract "We have to develop some general knowledge 
before being able to apply it to a new technology."
S2 Electronics Production Director HMT Abstract "R&D for us is aimed at enhancing mainly basic 
knowledge." 
S3 Chains R&D Director LMT Applied "We invest in machineries. We have to find ways to 
make our chains more robust and reliable."
S4 Carburators and 
injections
Production Director HMT Abstract "It takes years of research before being able to 
transform some knowledge into a new product."
S5 Frames R&D Director LMT Applied "When we invest in R&D, we mainly focus on 
processes for metal pressing. At the end of our 
study we often end up upgrading our plant 
technology."
S6 Forks and shock 
absorbers
Production Director LMT Applied "We immediately try to think of new applications"
S7 Forks and shock 
absorbers
R&D Director LMT Applied "Focus on results is our goal. If R&D does not lead 
to innovations, we consider it useless."
S8 Brakes and wheels R&D Director HMT Abstract "(…) we use less than 20% of the knowledge we 
develop. It does not matter: it all helps to have a 
clearer idea about what to do."
S9 Throttle systems, 
handlebars
Entrepreneur LMT Applied "Innovation for us mainly consists of new 
products."
S10 Engines Production Manager HMT Abstract "I wish we could make a new engine for every 
discovery we make. Most of the things we find out 
do not end up into innovations."
S11 Brakes and wheels R&D Director HMT "In our company R&D is a lot about physics, for 
example.(…) We just got a new guy who graduated 
in physics."
S12 Mechanical parts Production Manager LMT Abstract "We don't do much R&D…our products are too 
simple, anyone can make them. But we spend a lot 
of energy thinking about how to cut costs keeping 
the highest quality possible."
S13 Silencers Entrepreneur LMT Applied "While studying new ideas we directly develop 
new technologies."
S14 Lights R&D Director LMT Applied "R&D is quite irrelevant for us. Innovation is 
pulled by the product management office."
S15 Design and 
Engineering
R&D Director and 
entrepreneur
HMT Abstract "We always have to know more than our customers 
know. Always. Sometimes I end up wondering if 
it's even right to invest so much time in things we 
might never use."
S16 Wheels Production Manager LMT Applied "For us R&D means developing a new product or 
process."
S17 Lights R&D Director LMT Applied "Our lights must correspond to law requirements. 
We're not free to be too creative. This is why 
investing too much on breakthrough innovations 
for us is almost negative: we won't be able to 
produce them!"
S18 Design and 
Engineering
Technology 
Development Manager
HMT Abstract "I consider R&D so important, that my 
collaborators get higher prizes for the ideas they 
suggest than for the ones they turn into products or 
services."
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We need ideas, products, patents, revenues." LMT firms stressed the importance of time 
to innovation – that is the minimum time that a firm needs to obtain revenues from new 
knowledge – and seemed to value efficiency over originality. Quotations from the 
companies in the sample (table 3) consistently show that LMT and HMT firms differ in 
R&D strategies. While, ceteris paribus, LMT firms’ R&D investments are mainly 
targeted at developing specific applied knowledge, HMT firms’ R&D investments are 
principally focused on getting general abstract knowledge.  
This result is consistent with recent evidence from literature. Indeed scholars have 
started to control for technological rates when analyzing AC. For example, Grimpe and 
Sofka (2009) demonstrated that investments in R&D and consequent AC in LMT 
industries lead to superior innovation success if they are combined with a search pattern 
targeting market knowledge (i.e. customers and competitors). Instead, in HMT firms 
R&D commitment provides superior innovation success when combined with a search 
pattern targeting technological knowledge (i.e. universities and suppliers). This 
evidence presents R&D investments as a two-phase process: The first one stresses the 
“research” nature of activities, aimed at gathering knowledge and innovative 
contributions of science. Abstract knowledge is the first main outcome. However, only 
through a codification process do firms reach the following phase, where they benefit 
from the economic returns of their investments. The second phase, which is more 
focused on “development”, stresses the importance of practical application and 
transformation of knowledge into outcomes that can be leveraged to increase 
profitability.  In this sense, artifacts, machineries, patents, devices, and products 
represent the most common output. While HMT firms need to go through both 
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processes of R&D, LMT can directly access the second one. However, managers 
expressed their concerns about transforming former research investments into tangible 
profits. They seemed to be aware of the problem that turning research investments into 
real products is not trivial. Quotations show that managers know that only a minimum 
part of the firms’ knowledge becomes a finished product or tool. S4 production director 
affirmed: “Of course we try to exploit R&D investments at the best of our abilities. 
However, we use less than 20% of the knowledge we develop. It does not matter: it all 
helps to have a clearer idea about what to do.” Literature traditionally divides 
knowledge into abstract and codified (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Boisot (1999) affirmed 
that abstract knowledge has higher potential, but it requires time and effort to be 
codified into artifacts. So, on the one hand, we affirm that firms who seek general 
knowledge (such as mechanical principles or new materials developments) are more 
likely to reach disruptive innovation, but a longer path separates them from potential 
revenues, because R&D investments focused on basic knowledge require a codification 
phase before bringing about innovation. On the other hand, firms who seek applied 
knowledge face codification issues during the search itself. Hence, the time to 
innovation is shorter, but the outputs are more likely to be incremental, rather than 
disruptive. Quotations from the field support this perspective: “We noticed that if we try 
directly to develop a new product, most of the time it will end up being an incremental 
innovation” (S1, R&D director). 
According to the theoretical model proposed by Zahra and George (2002), we 
believe that general and applied R&D may have different impact on potential AC 
(PACAP) and realized AC (RACAP). The authors consider PACAP the capability to 
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absorb knowledge without necessarily applying it for practical ends. Instead, RACAP 
involves transforming and exploiting the assimilated knowledge through firms’ 
operations (Zahra and George, 2002 : 191). Accordingly, we support a distinction 
concerning the interaction between R&D and AC: While R&D investments for general 
knowledge are a proxy for PACAP, those for applied knowledge impact RACAP.  
To sum up, evidence showed that R&D is divided into two sub-phases. HMT firms 
are more committed to the first one, which aims at obtaining basic, abstract knowledge. 
LMTs mainly focus on the second one, looking for codified, applied knowledge. To 
turn abstract knowledge into finished products, HMT firms need to go through a 
specific codification phase. It is a misleading assumption that all firms in an industry 
follow the same strategy. In fact, even within the same industry, internal competition 
determines commitment to technology and, thus, different R&D strategies. Firms are 
aware that research in basic knowledge has higher potential for disruptive innovation in 
comparison to applied knowledge. But they also know that it is not trivial to transform 
basic knowledge into applied knowledge and outcomes. Hence, not all the firms that 
obtain basic knowledge manage to transform it into final outputs. Finally, while the 
investments in the first phase of R&D influence PACAP, investments in the second 
phase affect RACAP because the former is aimed at developing general knowledge that 
the latter exploits to obtain new products and solutions.   
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Effects of Relationships on R&D Strategies 
According to prior literature, firms mostly develop AC through external ties, such as 
dyads and networks (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Peters and Johnston, 2009; Tsai, 2001). 
Similarly, the concept of relative absorptive capacity explains that AC is conditioned 
on dyadic-specific attributes such as similarity of both firms’ (1) knowledge bases, (2) 
organizational structures and compensation policies, and (3) dominant logics (Lane and 
Lubatkin, 1998 : 461). In a relational perspective, strong ties are believed to increase 
relational rents, decrease communication costs, and avoid opportunistic behaviors, thus 
benefiting both partners involved in the collaboration (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). For 
example, scholars have demonstrated that especially in the automotive supply networks 
trust enhances innovation and economic performance (Dyer and Chu, 2000, 2003). 
When two firms engage in a partnership, they try to reduce uncertainty and opportunism 
through asset specificity, defined as an transaction-specific investment (Williamson, 
1979, 1985). Relational view scholars have shown how firms rely on different ways to 
develop asset specificity. According to Nishiguchi (1994 : 12) asset specificity 
investments can be classified in (1) Site specificity (e.g. co-location of manufacturing 
facilities; co-location of labs and R&D centers; customer trial centers); (2) Physical 
asset specificity (e.g. dedicated manufacturing lines; dedicated moulds; dedicated tools); 
(3) Human asset specificity (e.g. dedicated human resources; dedicated investments in 
training and education). Generally speaking, asset specificity can be leveraged to foster 
both general and applied knowledge. Literature posits that it is generally easier to 
protect innovation when embedded into artifacts, technologies, and codified solutions. 
Instead, abstract knowledge usually belongs to the public domain and therefore tends to 
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be hardly controlled by appropriation regimes. Along these lines, we should expect a 
higher commitment toward asset specificity for those firms that highly invest in general 
knowledge. However, evidence from our interviews did not confirm this common 
intuition. In table 4 quotations report how both HMT and LMT strongly rely on asset 
specificity to enhance their AC. In a manufacturing network of dense ties like the Italian 
motorcycle part industry, firms’ commitment to alliances is more relevant than their 
technological level in defining R&D investments toward asset specificity. A firm’s 
alliance strategy affects its engagement in asset specific R&D activities more than 
technological contingencies. In our sample, suppliers engaged in partnerships and 
commercial relations since the very beginning of the industry and highly valued being 
able to continue these relationships. Table 1 shows the average years of collaboration 
and the number of ongoing relations at t3. Along these lines, Koza and Lewin affirmed 
that “strategic alliances are embedded within the firm's history and strategic portfolio 
and co-evolve with the firm's strategy, the institutional, organizational, and competitive 
environment, and with management strategic intent for the alliance.” (1998 : 261).  
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TABLE 4 
Quotations About Asset Specific Investments 
 
Evidence from our interviews sheds light on another relevant motivation toward 
relational investments. Since asset specificity is often the result of co-investments 
between partners, empowered resources allow firms to shorten the time to innovation. 
For example, when in 2005 the firm S6 developed a new front fork for the awarded 
motorcycle MV Agusta Brutale 750cc, a small team of both the supplier’s and the 
OEM’s  designers was established. The emerging technology of reverse fork tubes was 
Supplier Product/Service Interviewee Technological Level R&D focus Quotations on asset specificity
S1 Electronics R&D Director HMT Abstract "We constantly invest with our customers for dedicated 
production lines."
S2 Electronics Production Director HMT Abstract "Since the last 15 years the co-patenting activity with our 
customers is definitely increased."
S3 Chains R&D Director LMT Applied "We made these special sets of moulds for our Japanese 
customers."
S4 Carburators and 
injections
Production Director HMT Abstract "Every engine is different from the other. All we do is totally 
customized and both we and our customers invest in specific 
machineries to make our fuel injection systems."
S5 Frames R&D Director LMT Applied "Honda helped us to buidt a production plant in Spain, so that we 
could manufacture next to their company."
S6 Forks and shock 
absorbers
Production Director LMT Applied "We dedicate at least one technician to each one of our main 
customers."
S7 Forks and shock 
absorbers
R&D Director LMT Applied "We develop joint investments with our customers every year, 
since every fork fits only a single motorcycle model."
S8 Brakes and wheels R&D Director HMT Abstract "Most of the co-investments are dedicated to the racing 
innovations. Most of the time we use what we discover in the 
racing world to innovate our mass-market products"
S9 Throttle systems, 
handlebars
Entrepreneur LMT Applied "We are developing with our customer an innovative throttle 
transmission system. The customer is participating in the costs of 
development."
S10 Engines Production Manager HMT Abstract "The engine is the heart of every motorcycle. This is why every 
product we make is customized on for our customers (…) several 
times our customers participate in the investments for our 
S11 Brakes and wheels R&D Director HMT "We have made this production line with Ducati. They 
economically helped us to develop it as they wanted."
S12 Mechanical parts Production Manager LMT Abstract "Every mould is specific for one customer."
S13 Silencers Entrepreneur LMT Applied "Silencers are usually standard products. But in some cases, like 
the titanium silencer, we had to develop something specific, 
following the indications of our trial customers."
S14 Lights R&D Director LMT Applied "Have you ever seen a two motorcycles with the same lights? 
Never. Every two-wheel vehicles need its own product, which 
means, specific moulds, parts and testing lines."
S15 Design and 
Engineering
R&D Director and 
entrepreneur
HMT Abstract "Most of our services are based on cad-cam scanners. Sometimes 
to provide new services we are required to upgrade our 
instruments. In some cases, firms helped us to purchase new 
machineries just because they fitted with the ones they owned."
S16 Wheels Production Manager LMT Applied "All the moulds you see are personalized for OEM 
manufacturers. Only after-sales products can avoid 
personalizations."
S17 Lights R&D Director LMT Applied "Ducati asked us to develop a new front light for the Streetfighter 
model that looked like a led-lights effects. From this collaboration 
we developed a completely new light technology for the two-
wheels vehicles."
S18 Design and 
Engineering
Technology 
Development Manager
HMT Abstract "Our designers spend time at our customer's plant to better 
understand their needs. Their training is customized and their 
activities are totally focused on a single OEM's requirement."
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adapted to the new MV Agusta model in a shorter time thanks to the joint efforts of a 
team composed of twice the number of designers with different skills than usual. 
Thanks to human asset specificity, firms have learnt in a shorter time how to apply 
innovative knowledge of a specific technology to a real finished product (i.e. reverse 
tube forks). S5 managers who developed the first “fuel in frame” technology and the 
dual use of the swing fork as an oil tank with Buell (Harley-Davidson group) in the 
early 1990s reported a similar situation. Other quotes confirm the positive effect of asset 
specificity on development time: “It is always complicated to transform general 
knowledge into a product or process. Furthermore it takes a long time. Involving our 
customers in this process gives us to access to more resources, and hence it reduces the 
time required to generate an innovation” (S2 production director). Along these lines S18 
technology development manager affirmed: “Involving our customers in our R&D 
projects helps us in two ways: first we speed up the project pace, and, second, it 
convinces them that we are not wasting time. To obtain outstanding results we need 
time, and when our customers see what we are doing, they will realize it and maybe be 
more understanding.” Being able to access additional resources permits firms to reduce 
the codification phase and reach the expected output in shorter time. In industries where 
time-to-market and first-mover advantage are relevant to outperforming competitors, 
firms’ investments in asset specificity may yield a competitive advantage. According to 
quotations in table 5, asset specific investments not only discourage opportunistic 
behaviors, but also decrease time to innovation, thus breeding trust between partners.  
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TABLE 5 
Quotations About Benefits of Asset Specificity for HMT Suppliers 
 
In summary, firms learn from external ties. External learning relationships are bred 
via joint investments in asset specificity, which increase resources, promote trust, and 
inhibit opportunism. As a consequence, it also decreases time to innovation. Although 
firms care about exploiting strategic knowledge, firms’ commitment to strategic 
alliances has a bigger influence on their tendency to invest in asset specificity. Hence, 
firms with strong ties are expected to be more committed to transaction specific 
investments than firms with weak ties. 
 
A Classification of R&D Investments   
So far, evidence from this study has offered several insights into the opacity of R&D 
and has fostered a better understanding of the connection between different forms of 
R&D and learning processes. Firstly, field data has suggested that R&D depends on the 
type of knowledge that firms want to obtain (knowledge scope) and is thus often related 
Supplier Product/Service Interviewee Technological Level R&D focus Quotations on asset specificity benefits
S1 Electronics R&D Director HMT Abstract "Co-designed project have usually a faster pace than the 
other ones."
S2 Electronics Production Director HMT Abstract "It is always complicated to transform general knowledge 
into a product or process. Furthermore it takes long time. 
Involving our customers in this process give us to access to 
more resources, and hence it reduces the time required to 
generate an innovation."
S4 Carburators and 
injections
Production Director HMT Abstract "BMW helped us to develop the new production line in a 
shorte time. After that, our relationship improved a lot."
S10 Engines Production Manager HMT Abstract "Investing with our customers help to make them trust what 
we're doing"
S11 Brakes and wheels R&D Director HMT "We built a co-design center with 25 cad and 5 cam design 
desks. Invoving our customers in this process help us to be 
faster at transforming ideas into products."
S18 Design and 
Engineering
Technology 
Development Manager
HMT Abstract “Involving our customers in our R&D projects help us in 
two ways: first we speed up the project pace, and second it 
convinces them that we are not wasting time. To obtain 
outstanding results we need time, and if our customers can 
see what we are doing, they will realize it and maybe be 
more understanding.” 
 	   123	  
to the individual firms’ technological level. In contrast to previous research, we claim 
that the assumption that all firms within an industry share the same technological level 
is misleading. The Italian motorcycle industry has shown us that what management 
scholarship would traditionally consider a medium-technology environment presents 
firms with different levels of technological skill and, hence, different R&D activities 
and strategies. Secondly, we have shown how transaction-specific R&D investments 
provide benefits in building trust among partners and in decreasing time to innovation. 
This is particularly relevant for HMT firms that generally struggle to defend abstract 
knowledge ownership and need more time to reach returns derived from innovation 
development. In this section, we contribute to AC literature by suggesting a theoretical 
framework that specifies the different forms of R&D and provides a classification of 
knowledge absorption activities. We attempt to provide a tool that scholars can apply to 
any type of firm and in any industry or technological environment. Combining R&D 
scope – general knowledge vs. applied knowledge – with relation-specific R&D 
attributes – generic asset vs. specific asset  – we build a matrix that contains four types 
of R&D strategies. Figure 2 summarizes the main features of the four R&D forms: (1) 
αR&D (abstract knowledge; general assets) aims at creating basic knowledge, such as 
biochemistry discoveries for a pharmaceutical firm or material engineering discoveries 
for a mechanical firm. We expect that αR&D results have no direct application on 
practical processes and artifacts. HMT firms engage in αR&D on principle without 
investing in transaction-specific assets. αR&D’s outcomes need to be codified before 
being transformed into products, which increases the time to innovation. (2) βR&D 
(abstract knowledge; specialized assets) aims at generating basic knowledge through 
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collaborations with other organizations. It implies dedication to relation-specific 
investments. Similarly to αR&D, βR&D leads to abstract knowledge and requires a 
codification process. However, the participation of an external partner reduces the time 
to innovation, thanks to additional resources and trust between the partners. Due to this 
reason, it is of particular relevance to HMT firms attempting to control abstract 
knowledge ownership. Deriving from advances in basic scientific knowledge, both 
αR&D and βR&D have high potential for disruptive innovations. (3) γR&D (codified 
knowledge, generic assets) aims at gathering applied knowledge to develop products, 
patents, machineries, and manufacturing solutions. Firms engage in γR&D without 
transaction-specific investments. It is more common among firms whose moderate 
technology allows for a direct focus on finished products, without necessarily 
developing basic knowledge first. It usually leads to incremental innovations. (4) δR&D 
(codified knowledge; specific assets) focuses on the development of applied knowledge 
via transaction-specific investments. Similarly to γR&D activities, LMT firms leverage 
directly on δR&D, whereby they are often able to avoid investments in general 
knowledge. Due to the hypercompetition of high-tech environments, HMT firms seek 
groundbreaking innovations. Therefore, they often engage in γR&D and αR&D projects 
first, whose output are then codified through δR&D. The investments in asset 
specificity, just as in βR&D, favor trust and decrease the opportunism between partners. 
Also, the joint effort of multiple partners reduces the time to innovation.  
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FIGURE 2 
Typology Of R&D Investments Based on Knowledge Scope and Asset Specificity  
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While we have affirmed that R&D is a multifaceted concept, we still need to 
establish how different R&D forms condition a firm’s AC process. Figure 3 depicts a 
novel theoretical model, where the four types of R&D interact with previous results 
deducted from AC. The model sums up the different strategies that firms may choose 
while developing a knowledge absorption capability. αR&D and βR&D seek abstract 
knowledge. Basic knowledge has great potential, since disruptive innovations often 
derive from discoveries in basic science.  
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FIGURE 3 
Effects of Different R&D Forms, Through a Synthetic Absorptive Capacity Model 
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firm’s decision about which R&D strategy to choose. In fact, a firm may decide not to 
rely on external parties if it believes that the ongoing appropriation regime sufficiently 
guarantees protection against knowledge “predators”. However, not all knowledge can 
be protected. When a firm is not able to exploit its own discoveries due to predatory 
activities of other competitors, the PACAP cannot be activated. In those cases firms 
tend to consider the R&D investment as an economic failure, since not only misses the 
developing firm out on quasi-rents derived from new knowledge, but competitors also 
might attain a competitive advantage. For example, Honda has struggled to protect the 
performing aerodynamic design of the scooter Honda model SH, which was developed 
with S18. However, some Chinese and Japanese firms have recently marketed new 
scooters that clearly imitate the shield and main design of the SH scooter. Honda and its 
suppliers have not been able to prevent this imitation. In fact, in the scooter industry 
aerodynamics imitation is legal if the copier changes a few details of the original 
product. Zahra and George’s model (2002 : 192) shows that regimes of appropriability 
affect the AC model only in the last phase, when firms exploit RACAP to reach a 
competitive advantage. Our study meanwhile argues that regimes of appropriability 
affect AC also in previous phases, such as the decision making process that firms face 
before engaging in any R&D activity, and during the absorption of basic knowledge 
leading to PACAP. γR&D and δR&D target the absorption of applied knowledge. 
Targeting RACAP directly allows a firm to skip the codification process. However, 
when expertise is based on established knowledge, the likelihood of causing disruptive 
innovation is lower. δR&D and βR&D activities evolve through specific assets, which 
are financed by two or more associates. Literature has demonstrated that in this case the 
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specific characteristics of learning partnerships affect the outcomes of such investments. 
According to the results from Lane and Lubatkin’s study on pharmaceutical-
biotechnological R&D alliances (1998), we claim that one’s firm ability to learn from 
the other is conditioned on both firms’ (1) knowledge bases, (2) organizational 
structures and compensation policies, and (3) dominant logics. On the one hand, a firm 
that engages in an R&D alliance gains a temporary increase of resources. On the other 
hand, the success of the partnership is more uncertain, since sharing similarities – such 
as similar approaches to knowledge acquisition, or mental models – with the other 
parties is an aspect that firms cannot keep under total control. For this particular reason, 
firms that know their partners’ characteristics well are expected to have a better 
forecasting skill of future outcomes and landscapes. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although based on different premises and methods, the majority of studies agree that 
R&D represents the best proxy to observe AC. We have claimed that research should 
start from an updated definition of R&D to create a common ground where 
heterogeneous contributions may concur. Scholarship has dedicated little attention to 
the definition of research and development. We have shown how prior studies lack a 
fine-grained analysis of learning investments and routines. Also, with few exceptions, 
R&D has been associated with high-tech environments only. While lacking a common 
ground to foster consistent contributions, scholars have followed two main theoretical 
directions. The first approach has followed the traditional definition of Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990), principally focusing on R&D figures through cross-sectional 
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approaches. The second group of scholars has gone along with a process interpretation 
of relational variables, often leveraging on longitudinal analysis. The two streams of 
literature are so divergent that scholars have considered their results as incomparable 
and in some cases even inconclusive (Lane et al., 2006 : 844). Consequently, the goal of 
our study was to unpack the definition of R&D and frame it in a process fashion. We 
have attempted to provide scholars with a detailed definition of R&D that can be used 
in process analysis. Our work has advanced a general interpretation of R&D, unpacking 
it in two main dimensions: (1) knowledge scope (abstract/basic knowledge vs. 
codified/applied knowledge), and (2) asset specificity (generic assets vs. specific 
assets). Combining these two dimensions, a four-type classification of R&D forms has 
emerged. Each one of the four R&D types has different implications for knowledge 
output and relational strategy: (1) αR&D (abstract knowledge; generic assets); (2) 
βR&D (abstract knowledge; specific assets); (3) γR&D (codified knowledge, generic 
assets); (4) δR&D (codified knowledge; specific assets). Framing the building blocks of 
R&D strategies into a theoretical model of AC, we have identified four different paths. 
Evidence has shown that within the Italian motorcycle industry parts manufacturers 
vary from LMT to HMT. We have claimed that it is misleading to assume that all firms 
within an industry have the same level of technology and, hence, R&D strategies. As 
products become more complex, technological level tends to greatly vary even within 
the same industry. Hence, assuming homogeneity of R&D strategies within the same 
industry is misleading. Scholars should consider the possibility that different firms 
might have different approaches to R&D, even within the same industry or market. 
Also, we have argued that intervening variables formerly introduced in literature need 
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further specification. Our study argues that regimes of appropriability do not only affect 
the exploitation phase following RACAP (Zahra and George, 2002), but also influence 
the decision-making process preceding a firm’s commitment in any R&D strategy and 
the creation of PACAP after a firm’s involvement in R&D projects that target abstract 
knowledge (i.e. during αR&D and βR&D activities). Finally, we have argued that 
similarities between a teacher and a student firm are particularly relevant for those firms 
who seal their alliances through asset specific investments. In accord with Williamson 
(1985), we agree that asset specificity reduces opportunism and increases trust and 
resources in learning relationships. However, relational AC is conditioned by partners’ 
(1) knowledge bases, (2) organizational structures and compensation policies, (3) 
dominant logics (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), which are not under the complete control 
of the participants. Therefore, entering in an alliance implies a certain degree of 
uncertainty. To reduce the risk of predatory behaviors, managers should strive for 
thorough knowledge of external partners before starting any R&D collaborations. 
Although this contribution reveals some of the most hidden issues of AC, it contains 
some limitations. We chose to examine the Italian motorcycle part industry due to its 
heterogeneity of firms and technological variety. However, it would be interesting to 
confirm our results in other environments, especially in low-tech and service industries, 
which literature has rarely taken into consideration when observing AC. The use of 
qualitative data is consistent with the process interpretation we presented. Still, it would 
be interesting to test our results with larger samples and quantitative methods. Finally, 
our work is based on a localized industry. Although scholars have previously 
considered the Italian motorcycle industry as an interesting field to develop theory, it 
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would be rewarding to explore different settings in other parts of the world. As global 
competition becomes tougher and technological development accelerates, managers 
have to reach a deeper self-awareness of rent-generation dynamics, especially when 
these underpin intangible resources such as superior learning capabilities. By unpacking 
R&D, we have tried to shed light on an opaque aspect concerning both research and 
practice: to observe a firm’s learning capability, scholars should use more specific 
definitions of research and development. We hope that our reflections will provide a 
useful base for fostering consistent research and successful strategies. 
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APPENDIX 
Examples of questions asked during the non-structured interviews. 
How would you define R&D investments?  
What is the R&D investment goal in your firm? Give examples. 
What kind of activities do you develop through R&D investments? 
What kind of activities does your company develop to sustain knowledge acquisition 
and innovation? 
What are the main sources to increase your company’s knowledge assets? 
How much of what you have developed depends on knowledge you acquired from your 
customers?  
How much of your R&D investments are dedicated to a specific transaction? 
How do you protect the outcomes of your R&D investments? 
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